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foreWord
The vote on Scottish Independence will take place on 18 September 2014. 
Irrespective of the result, it is likely that Scotland will eventually have more say 
over its taxes than it currently does, either through independence or some form of 
further devolution.  
ICAS is continuing to contribute to the crucial debate on independence by asking 
the important questions from its field of expertise and raising the issues that 
are in the public interest, whilst maintaining an apolitical stance.  As part of this 
programme of work, ICAS commissioned an independent team of academics 
to undertake a project to consider the tax implications relating to Scottish 
independence or further devolution.  This resultant report takes no view on the 
desirability of the various options, but rather sets out to help establish the factors 
that should be taken into account if change is to be achieved successfully. Whilst 
focusing on Scotland, some of the issues raised in this report would also be 
relevant to other jurisdictions that are considering some form of devolution of taxes 
or the establishment of a new tax system.
The original call for research identified the questions that ICAS considered were 
important to consider in the debate and this research project sought to address 
these questions by way of a review of existing literature and interviews of 19 
individuals.  The questions covered issues such as: the suitability of the current 
tax system to Scotland, practical issues arising in developing and administering a 
new tax system; the determining factors for designing a new system; the trade-offs 
and compromises involved; the time required for implementation; implementation 
issues; risks; educational needs to support a new system; compliance issues; and 
insights from other countries.
The report suggests that the tax implications of independence or devolution may 
be more complex than widely thought, and highlights issues that will need to be 
considered.  Many of the issues arising under further devolution or independence 
will be the same, such as the risks involved and education needs: the difference will 
be the degree or scale. Other issues identified are specific to independence, such 
as the design of a new tax system and the status of double taxation agreements.   
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This project was funded by the Scottish Accountancy Trust for Education and 
Research (SATER – see page 85). The Research Committee of ICAS has also been 
pleased to support this project. The Committee recognises that the views expressed 
do not necessarily represent those of ICAS itself, but hopes that the results of this 
independent research will contribute to the debate and assist those involved in any 
future devolution of taxes to Scotland whatever the result of the ‘vote’ in September 
2014. 
Allister Wilson
Convener of ICAS Research Committee
May 2014
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helpful comments of anonymous reviewers of the draft report.
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execuTive summarY
1. This report addresses a series of questions regarding the tax implications 
of Scottish independence or further devolution on the basis of an extensive 
interdisciplinary literature review (covering both academic and professional 
publications) and interviews with 19 individuals who were tax experts or senior 
civil servants in relevant departments or both. This investigation suggests that 
the tax implications of independence or further devolution may be more complex 
than might be widely thought.
2. There is a wide range of tax options available to Scotland under further 
devolution or independence which would require careful consideration. One 
possibility is maintaining the status quo (under devolution) or adopting it (under 
independence) which would have the advantage of using a known system. In 
comparison, the introduction of different or new taxes (under devolution or 
independence) or the design of a wholly new tax system (under independence) 
could be complex. There is, however, a difference between the two scenarios 
in that with further devolution, reform may be introduced without the pressures 
that might be involved in tax reform in a newly independent country. It could, for 
instance, be introduced in stages and at a timing of the Government’s choosing. 
(It should be noted that the words ‘new tax system’ are themselves often used 
without specific definition and might carry different meanings, dependent on 
circumstances. They would always imply, however, one or more substantially 
new elements.)
3. In the event of independence, the Scottish Government (2013a) has stated that 
it intends to develop a new tax system for Scotland. However, even with an 
independent Scotland, such an outcome is uncertain, because a new Scottish 
Parliament would be elected and a new Scottish Government formed. In 
practice the outcome might be something between an entirely new system and 
the current tax system. 
4. There is a considerable overlap of the tax implications of the different 
possibilities involving either independence or further devolution. Some issues, 
for example, the design of a new tax system of the sort envisaged by the 
Scottish Government (2013a) and the status of double taxation agreements, 
would only be relevant in the case of Scottish independence. Other matters, 
such as those relating to education, risks and practical implications, are broadly 
similar for either independence or further devolution.
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5. In general the evidence suggests the UK tax system works reasonably well in 
a complex and changing environment, but there is scope for improvement. The 
Scottish Government (2013a) suggests that “the UK tax system is complex and 
inefficient” (p. 118) and that it intends to develop a new tax system for Scotland 
“based on the design principles of a modern and efficient system” (p. 122). This 
is a laudable aim but there are many reasons why modern tax systems are not 
closely aligned with such principles in practice and tend to become complex. 
Devising a new tax system that is workable and acceptable to Scottish taxpayers 
would involve many serious challenges.
6. There would be numerous practical issues involved in developing and 
administering a new or supplementary tax system. These include establishing 
a skilled tax administration in Scotland to replace HM Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC), ensuring that double taxation and effective information exchange 
agreements were in place, clarifying the standing of UK case law, agreeing the 
definition of Scottish resident or taxpayer as well as ensuring an effective IT 
system including online filing.
7. In deciding whether to base change on the existing system (a ‘legacy approach’) 
or to design a new one, the former has the advantage of starting with a 
functioning tax system which can then be developed over the course of time. 
However, this approach risks the creation of an overly complex system which 
lacks coherence and may miss the ‘big picture’. On the other hand, whilst 
developing a new tax system offers the opportunity to create a coherent system, 
it also risks generating unintended consequences and would raise issues about 
the acceptance of, and compliance with, the new system. The risks involved in 
tax reform are likely to be much lower where change is incremental rather than 
associated with a ‘new start’.
8. There are many trade-offs and compromises involved in modern tax design. 
One example is simplicity versus fairness. A simple tax system has many 
attractions, but may not take sufficient account of different circumstances to be 
acceptable to taxpayers. Another example is the trade-offs and compromises 
required in terms of the policy objectives of taxation versus the levels of taxes 
set. There may be a fine balance between ensuring sufficient revenue to fund 
the desired levels of public expenditure and creating a system that does not 
excessively distort economic behaviour or arouse serious taxpayer resistance. 
Achieving such a balance can take time and experience.
9. The length of time required to develop and implement new taxes or a new 
system depends, of course, on the features of the tax or system, the extent to 
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which it is acceptable to taxpayers and the capacity of the revenue authorities 
to support such changes. A process of developing a new tax system, including 
taxpayer consultation, producing a new tax code, recruiting and training tax 
officials, developing IT systems and preparing taxpayers could take a period of 
years. Further devolution of existing taxes to Scotland would not require the 
same level of change and support.
10. The biggest risk associated with a new tax system, such as that described 
by the Scottish Government (2013a), or any other, is whether it will deliver 
the desired revenue. Tax compliance is an important issue and the report 
describes a system of compliance risk management. Another is the 
international dimension which raises considerations of tax competition and 
tax harmonisation. A national tax system that deviates significantly from those 
in other countries may generate economic effects that include undesirable 
movements of capital and labour. In recognition of the risks involved the report 
offers a strategic approach to the development tax of policy. There would also 
be risks involved in the further devolution of taxes but they would not be on the 
same scale. However, the further devolution of taxation might also benefit from 
a strategic rather than an ad hoc approach to tax reform.
11. In examining the tax experiences of other ‘new’ countries or regions, there are 
few specific lessons that would be immediately applicable without qualification 
to the tax implications of Scottish independence or further devolution. In 
particular, the experiences from federal systems, such as those in the USA 
and Switzerland, are not readily applicable to the situation of an independent 
Scotland and the rest of the UK (rUK).
12. A new tax system for an independent Scotland or the introduction of new taxes 
under further devolution would require considerable professional and public 
education.
13. A new tax system under independence or further devolution of taxes would 
raise a range of issues relating to tax avoidance.
14. The tax implications relating to the wide range of possibilities associated with 
Scottish independence or further devolution are far reaching. This report 
takes no view on the desirability of the various options but rather sets out 
to help establish the factors that should be taken into account if change is 
to be successfully achieved. To that end it also offers suggestions regarding 
successful tax compliance risk management and a strategic approach to the 
development of tax policy.
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1. inTroducTion
This report considers the practical implications of further devolution of tax powers 
in Scotland or an independent tax regime under independence. It addresses specific 
topics (as set out in Chapter 4) in the context of the following over-arching issues:
•	 The	application	of	the	principles	of	taxation	particularly	relating	to	the	efficiency	
and fairness of taxes and how they may be used to support government policy.
•	 Ensuring	compliance	and	tackling	avoidance	and	evasion.
•	 Development	and	implementation	of	tax	systems	(under	further	devolution	or	
under independence).
•	 Change	management	in	relation	to	tax	systems.
The report seeks to provide impartial and independent comment on the issues 
of taxation in Scotland. The authors of the report have no allegiance or links to 
any parties (political or otherwise) involved in the discussions over the future of 
Scotland. It is not the purpose of this report to recommend any course of action in 
respect of further devolution or independence, but to set out the implications and 
ramifications contingent on both of these options. It should be borne in mind that 
each of the topics addressed here has been considered only briefly, otherwise this 
report could have run to several volumes.
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2. conTexT
Scotland has a unique place in the UK, in that unlike Wales and Northern Ireland, 
it retained its own hybrid legal system when joining with England to form the UK 
rather than adopting the common law system used across the rest of the UK (rUK). 
Whilst Scotland retained its own legal system and many of its own laws, some 
laws are shared with the rest of the UK, including tax law. This changed following 
devolution in 1998.
After the vote in favour of devolution, the Scotland Act 1998 devolved power to the 
Scottish Parliament to legislate on a wide range of subjects. Several subjects where 
consistency across the UK was important were reserved to the UK Parliament 
under Schedule 5 of the Act. These included taxation, with the exception of local 
taxes to fund local authorities. The Act also provided, in Section 73, power to the 
Scottish Parliament to vary the basic rate of income tax by 3%. Section 75 of the 
Act then defined a Scottish taxpayer as someone who is resident in the UK and for 
whom “Scotland is the part of the United Kingdom with which he has the closest 
connection”. This section was amended by the Scotland Act 2012 which expanded 
the definition to specifically include anyone resident in Scotland for income tax 
purposes or anyone with a close connection to Scotland.1 Any amounts collected 
under this power are to be paid to or drawn from the Scottish Consolidated Fund 
(where there is an increase or a decrease in the tax respectively). To date (March 
2014) this power has not been used. After devolution, most taxes in Scotland 
continued to be collected and administered by HMRC, with the exception of local 
taxes which are collected by the local authorities. A list of current taxes collected in 
Scotland is contained in Appendix 1.
In 2008, ten years after devolution, the Commission on Scottish Devolution (the 
Calman Commission) was established to review the experience of devolution 
so far. The Calman Commission reported in 2009 and made a number of 
recommendations in relation to the future of devolution. The Calman Report 
included a number of recommendations relating to tax and fiscal policy, including 
that the Scottish Parliament should be able to set the rate of income tax in Scotland, 
although this would continue to be collected and administered by HMRC. The 
Calman Commission also recommended that Stamp Duty Land Tax, Aggregates 
Levy, Landfill Tax and Air Passenger Duty should be devolved to the Scottish 
Parliament. It further recommended that the Scottish Parliament should be given 
the power to introduce new taxes in Scotland with the agreement of the UK 
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Parliament. It recommended that these changes be introduced in an incremental 
manner to minimise the risks of instability or shocks to the Scottish budget. The 
Calman Commission also recommended further borrowing powers for Scottish 
Ministers.
Many of the Calman recommendations were implemented in the Scotland Act 2012 
which further devolved tax powers to the Scottish Parliament, giving it the power 
to set the Scottish Rate of Income Tax (SRIT), also the taxes on land and buildings 
transactions and waste disposal to landfill. These changes are expected to take 
effect in April 2015, at which point the existing Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) and 
Landfill Tax will not apply in Scotland, being replaced by the Land and Building 
Transaction Tax (LBTT) and Scottish Landfill Tax respectively. It also provided that 
the Scottish block grant would be reduced commensurate with the income expected 
from these taxes. The provisions on the Scottish Rate of Income Tax (SRIT) are 
expected to take effect on 1 April 2016. Further consultation or legislative proposals 
on this are yet to take place. However, HMRC and the Scottish Government agreed 
a Memorandum of Understanding on 14 February 2013 on how to address this 
issue. HMRC has also issued a technical note Clarifying the Scope of the Scottish 
Rate of Income Tax (HMRC, 2012). A separate body established by the Scottish 
Government, viz., Revenue Scotland, will be responsible for collecting LBTT and 
Landfill Tax.
The Scotland Act 2012 also provides powers for new taxes to be created in 
Scotland and for additional taxes to be devolved. The first report of the Fiscal 
Commission Working Group (2013a, p. 10) set up by the Scottish Government 
reported that, under present plans, 16% of tax revenues would be devolved to 
Scotland by 2016.
The constitutional debate has been ongoing in Scotland since before the 
introduction of devolution. However, since devolution and in particular since the 
Scottish National Party (SNP) gained a majority in the Scottish Parliament in 2011, 
the constitutional debate has increased. Various options have been put forward 
from retaining the status quo to full independence. Between these two options there 
is a wide range of possibilities of further devolution. To many, the concept of further 
devolution is less clear cut than that of independence, possibly because there are 
varying degrees of devolution, including the contested concepts of ‘devolution max’ 
(devo-max) or ‘independence-lite’, as shown in Figure 1.
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figure 1  spectrum of devolution/independence in relation to tax
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Further devolution could range from additional minor powers to just short of 
full independence. The core discussion on further devolution appears to focus 
on ‘devolution max’ as an alternative to full independence. However, Mullen and 
Tierney (2012) note that there is no single definition of ‘devolution max’ although 
various definitions include further devolution of taxation, defence, foreign affairs 
and social security. In particular, questions arise in relation to what the implications 
of further devolution would be for taxation. If major changes to the tax system 
were adopted in Scotland under devolution, there may be wider issues to consider 
in terms of overall conceptual consistency. For example, if taxation was devolved 
and Scotland adopted an ideologically different model from rUK, this could cause 
considerable issues with consistency. Figure 2 shows some possible options in 
relation to tax in Scotland under further devolution or independence.
figure 2 some possible options in relation to tax in scotland under further 
devolution or independence
integral part 
of uK min
varying degrees of devolution
          max            
independence 
within a 
federation independence
All power 
held by UK 
Parliament 
therefore tax 
policy and 
administration 
controlled at 
UK level.
Minimum 
devolution 
(under 
Scotland Act 
1998) allows 
Scottish 
Parliament 
to add 5p 
to income 
tax, no other 
tax raising 
or varying 
powers.
Increased 
devolution 
(under 
Scotland 
Act 2012) 
transfers 
power to 
Scottish 
Parliament 
in relation to 
LBTT tax and 
Landfill Tax.
Increased 
devolution – 
continuum 
of further 
devolved 
powers in 
relation to 
tax policy or 
administration.
Devolution 
max – could 
provide for 
transfer of 
further or all 
powers in 
relation to tax 
raising and 
administration 
or full fiscal 
autonomy.
Overarching 
federal 
government may 
control some/
all tax policy and 
administration, 
and/or national 
government 
(Scotland) may 
control some/
all tax policy and 
administration 
(key issue is that 
there is equality 
between the 
federated states).
Scottish 
Government 
and Parliament 
have full 
control over 
tax policy and 
administration 
as a sovereign, 
independent 
state (within 
the limits of 
international 
law).
On 18 September 2014, the voters of Scotland will vote in a referendum to decide 
‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’. Should the vote be in favour, then 
work would begin on establishing Scotland as an independent, sovereign state 
recognised under international law.
The Fiscal Commission Working Group was set up by the Scottish Government 
to develop a fiscal and macroeconomic framework for an independent Scotland. 
It has published a number of reports, including one on the macroeconomic 
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framework (Fiscal Commission Working Group, 2013a), another on fiscal rules 
(Fiscal Commission Working Group, 2013b) and one on general principles on which 
the tax system in an independent Scotland might be based (Fiscal Commission 
Working Group, 2013c). Such principles have been described by various authorities 
in respect of a number of countries, including the Meade Committee (1978) and the 
Mirrlees Review (Mirrlees, 2010 and 2011) in the UK. These principles are examined 
further in Chapter 4 below (under question (i)). The Scottish Government’s (2013a) 
proposals regarding Scottish independence stated that the Scottish Government 
plans “to develop a new tax system for Scotland” (p. 122) would be based on these 
principles, although the particular issues this would involve were not addressed in 
detail. However, there were some specific proposals for Scotland, such as linking 
personal allowances and tax credits to inflation, a reduction in Air Passenger Duty 
and a competitive corporation tax levied at a rate of “up to three percentage points 
below the prevailing UK rate” (p. 119). Presumably the UK in this context means 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
The tax system that will be adopted by an independent Scotland is a key issue. 
Under independence, a new Scottish Parliament would be elected, leading in turn 
to a new Scottish Government. It would be for this government to decide on the 
tax system to be used. It is possible that it would choose to retain the current UK 
system, but it is also possible that it would choose to redesign the system from 
scratch or select any option in between. This report considers the options which 
might be available.
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3. meThodoloGY
The report is based on two elements:
(i) an extensive, interdisciplinary desk-based literature review (covering both 
academic and professional literature); and
(ii) a series of interviews with the following, listed in alphabetical order of surname:
•	 Alistair Brown, Fiscal Responsibility Division, Finance Directorate, Scottish 
Government
•	 Iain Campbell, Enforcement and Compliance, Organised Crime Policy and 
Planning Unit, HMRC Scotland
•	 Michael Clancy, Director of Law Reform, The Law Society of Scotland
•	 Stephen Coleclough, President, Chartered Institute of Taxation
•	 Alison Cumming, Fiscal Responsibility Division, Finance Directorate, Scottish 
Government
•	 Paul Dempsey, Assistant Secretary, Corporate Services Division, Irish 
Revenue Commissioners
•	 Eleanor Emberson, Head of Revenue Scotland and Director of Financial 
Strategy, Scottish Government
•	 Nicky Harrison, Chief Operating Officer, Revenue Scotland
•	 Karen Henderson, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, 
University of Leicester
•	 Peter Hobbs, Former Head of Tax, BP
•	 Brian Keegan, Director of Taxation, Chartered Accountants Ireland
•	 Lisa Lane, Thomas Westcott, Chartered Accountants
•	 Jeffrey Owens, Professor, Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law, 
Vienna University of Economics and Business, former Head of OECD Centre 
for Tax Policy and Administration
•	 Tina Riches, then Technical Director, Chartered Institute of Taxation
•	 Dale Simpson, Chairman, South West of England Branch, Chartered Institute 
of Taxation
•	 Patrick Stevens, Immediate Past President and (current) Tax Policy Director, 
Chartered Institute of Taxation
•	 Doug Stoneham, HMRC, London
•	 Chris Wales, PwC, Tax Adviser
•	 John Whiting, Tax Director, Office of Tax Simplification
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In the report which follows, interviewees are referred to anonymously by a 
number, which does not reflect their position in the above list. Most interviews 
were recorded, with interviewees’ permission, and then transcribed verbatim. The 
verbatim transcripts were then reviewed by the interviewees for accuracy and 
clarity, with some minor amendments being made. For interviews that were not 
recorded, detailed notes were made by the interviewer. 
The open-ended, semi-structured interviews used questions which were based 
on the ten research questions, as specifically set out in the original ICAS invitation 
for research proposals, together with one other question (question (i)), as detailed 
in Chapter 4. The interview structure thus provided a priori for the themes along 
which the interviews were subsequently analysed, using typical content analysis 
(see Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The transcripts of the 
interviews were read and re-read in order to develop a full understanding of the 
responses.
Both the literature review and interviews addressed the 11 topics and are integrated 
in the discussions in Chapter 4.
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4. research findinGs
In the context of the over-arching issues outlined in Chapter 1, the following 
ten questions, as specifically set out in the original ICAS invitation for research 
proposals, together with one other question (question (i)) are addressed. However, 
there is inevitably considerable overlap between some of the areas covered, and 
some topics might reasonably be addressed in response to several questions.
(i)  Is the current UK tax system fit for purpose for modern Scotland?
The starting point for this report was that at the date of writing (March 2014), 
Scotland, despite differences in other laws, remained largely subject to the same 
tax system as the rest of the UK. This raised the question of whether the current 
system was fit for purpose in Scotland, i.e. did it effectively and efficiently collect 
taxes in keeping with accepted tax principles such as fairness, etc. In terms of full 
fiscal independence in an independent Scotland or further devolution,2 the problem 
would be, to varying degrees, whether to retain whole or part of the existing UK 
system, or none of it, and, depending on the choice made, which elements to retain 
or devise anew. If a consensus were found, for example, that the current system 
did not work – or did not work in Scotland – then there would be no point in 
considering any substantial retention for the longer term of what already exists.
Aitken (2010, p 14) queries why it might be assumed that Scotland would 
“simply copy the present UK tax system”. Indeed, as indicated above, the Scottish 
Government (2013a) has now proposed to develop a new tax system for Scotland. 
However, Aitken acknowledges and recommends that:
As a starting point… if a tax were to be properly devolved, the UK 
legislation should be copied en masse. That would ensure a period 
of certainty, which is very important when such a major change is 
being undertaken. 
Most of the interviewees expressed a similar view, that is, that the system works, 
but is not perfect.
Yes, it is fit for purpose, because when all is said and done… , we 
are raising half a trillion pounds or whatever it is, it’s coming in 
reasonably efficiently… But – and you would expect the ‘but’ to 
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come – there are some creaks and cracks… (Interviewee 10)
The statistics show that 90% of their [UK’s] revenues come in 
without anybody having to do anything. And 3% come in with a 
bit of prodding, and then the 7% is the gap where the Revenue 
have to chase it. So, on those numbers, and those are the best in 
the western world, the system’s fine. There are problems with the 
tax system though: it’s not perfect by a long way. (Interviewee 12)
I think the easiest place from which to start is always a pre-
existing system that functions, that delivers revenue, [but] there 
are a lot of things in the UK tax code that I wouldn’t want to have 
in my personal ideal tax code. (Interviewee 14)
However:
The Calman Commission evidence suggested the devolution of 
some taxes and this possibly indicates that not everyone is content 
with how the UK tax system applies in Scotland… (Interviewee 11)
Interviewee 15, however, felt that the current UK system was not very efficient in 
terms of the amount it cost to collect, so that cast some doubt over the fitness of 
purpose of the current system.
Interviewees did feel, however, that any system changes would present 
opportunities for improvement and elimination of particular elements that do not 
work well (e.g. inheritance tax), and “nuancing” (Interviewee 9) to account for 
Scotland’s different legal system. This is perhaps summarised best by Interviewee 
14:
But would a UK-style tax system suit Scotland?  Well, it’s obviously 
worked, to some extent, today, so I would certainly think it was 
worthwhile taking most of it and just developing and adapting it, 
some of it perhaps a little bit during the transition, but more of it 
as time went on.
It is worth noting that many of the points highlighted above might be addressed 
by the UK Parliament within the current constitutional set-up, by the Scottish 
Parliament if further devolution over taxation were granted, or by the Scottish 
Parliament under independence. The only substantial point which applies solely to 
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independence is that of creating an entirely new system, as it likely that the power 
to make such change would only be available to a sovereign, independent state.
Many theorists have expended a great deal of thought and ink in considering what 
should be the underlying ideals and principles on which a tax system (and taxes 
generally) should be founded. Still relevant are the concepts (or canons) of equity/
proportionality, certainty, convenience and efficiency propounded by Adam Smith in 
Book 5 of his work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,3 
to which later theorists have added neutrality, correction/control/influencing of 
behaviour, flexibility, simplicity, fairness accountability and acceptability (in terms 
of behaviour of governments and individuals) (see Daunton, 2001). The Mirrlees 
Review of the UK tax system (Mirrlees, 2011, p. 22) accepted Smith’s canons as 
commanding “near-universal support but they are not comprehensive, and they do 
not help with the really difficult questions which arise when one objective is traded 
off against another”. The Review (pp. 22–23) goes on to say:
The way we formulate the objectives of a tax system is to say that 
for a given distributional outcome, what matters are:
•	 the	negative	effects	of	the	tax	system	on	welfare	and	economic	efficiency	–	
they should be minimized;
•	 administration	and	compliance	costs	–	all	things	equal,	a	system	that	costs	
less to operate is preferable;
•	 fairness	other	than	in	the	distributional	sense	–	for	example,	fairness	
of procedure, avoidance of discrimination, and fairness with respect to 
legitimate expectations;
•	 transparency	–	a	tax	system	that	people	can	understand	is	preferable	to	
one that taxes by ‘stealth’.
Simple, neutral, and stable tax systems are more likely to achieve 
these outcomes than are complex, non-neutral, and frequently 
changing systems. But simplicity, neutrality, and stability are 
desirable because they promote these ultimate outcomes, not in 
their own right.
However, “[i]t is generally acknowledged that the UK has one of the most 
complicated tax systems in the world” (Aitken, 2010, p. 14), rendered more complex 
because many elements cannot be divorced from their underlying history and/or 
connections to other elements. If one were designing it from first principles, one 
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would not start from where we are currently. William E. Simon, a former Secretary 
of the US Treasury, succinctly summarised this when he said that a “nation should 
have a tax system that looks like someone designed it on purpose” (US Treasury, 
1977). Most nations do not. Undoubtedly, the UK tax system does not have the 
appearance of a coherent design. The Mirrlees Review (2011, pp. 478–479) sets out 
the problems characterising the current UK tax system – “[a] jumble of tax rates, a 
lack of coherent vision of the tax base, and arbitrary discriminations across different 
types of economic activities”. It also (ibid.) sets out what a “good tax system” would 
look like. The 2013 Institute for Fiscal Studies report on Taxing an Independent 
Scotland (Adam et al., 2013) is heavily influenced by the Mirrlees Review. How far 
such a “good tax system” could, or even should, be implemented in its pure form 
after taking account of the many considerations involved in the operation of a tax 
system in practice is very relevant in the present context.
Tax simplicity is an area of tax policy where a wide context and trade-offs between 
inter-related factors need to be taken into account. Often the trade-off is between 
simplicity and horizontal and vertical equity, that is, a complex tax system can take 
better account of the different situations in which taxpayers may find themselves. 
A good example is provided by the UK’s Community Charge of 1989–90 (tried 
out first in Scotland), which was a well thought out tax, except in one crucial 
aspect: as a flat-rate tax it was felt to distinguish insufficiently well between 
individuals’ ability to pay, so violated equity – and with disastrous results (Smith, 
1991; Cullis et al., 1993; James, 2012a, pp. 56–57; James, 2012b, pp. 471–472).4  
This was unlike the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) in 1973, which met 
with widespread acceptance (James, 2012b). Also a more complex tax system 
can better differentiate between government policies, such as supporting certain 
activities and discouraging others. However, often the idea of tax simplicity is 
considered only in the context of simplification of tax law. The UK Tax Law Rewrite 
Project was established to redraft tax legislation “to make it clearer and easier to 
use, without changing the law” (Tax Law Rewrite, on HMRC’s website). Rewriting 
law is never easy, as is evident from the Tax Law Rewrite, which indicates that a 
number of statutory instruments has had to be put into place to implement “missed 
consequential amendments and errors”. Time to identify corrections has even 
been included as part of various Acts. The rewrite of UK tax law has undoubtedly 
resulted in a more voluminous body of legislation.
Complexity in tax law results from three things – language, policy and compliance – 
all of which would need to be addressed if tax is to be reformed (Tax Law Review 
Committee, Final Report, 1996, paragraph 6.10): it is not merely a linguistic problem, 
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as is often assumed and which was specifically revealed by a recent rewrite of 
Australian income tax law. Despite the rewrite producing legislation that was easier 
to read and understand, complexity remained as a result of its “wholly irrational 
and inconsistent policy base” (Krever, 2003, p. 493). More recent work (the 
Taylor Report, 2006,5 cited by James and Edwards, 2008, p. 44) commented that 
Australian tax law is still rendered complex by its “excessively detailed operational 
rules”. Acknowledgement that a broader approach is needed to tax simplification 
is commented on widely by researchers, for example, Owens and Hamilton (2004) 
and McKerchar et al. (2007), who compared the simplification process experiences 
of the USA, UK, Australia and New Zealand. All concur that a clear tax policy is 
a main component of making tax law simpler. The lessons from recent rewrite 
projects are self-evident for any rewrite of or new drafting of tax legislation for 
Scotland as part of further devolution or independence.
The Mirrlees Review comments further (p. 35) that optimal tax theory (discussed 
later, under questions (iii) and (iv)) considers how different tax objectives are traded 
off against one another. It is at least arguable that much of the current complexity 
of UK tax law is caused by a trade-off between different ‘ideal’ characteristics. 
For example, a complex tax may be perceived as fairer than a simpler one – and 
fairness is of great importance, as the example of the Community Charge shows.
The nature of an ideal tax has been the focus of much debate in recent years, and 
not all thinkers would necessarily agree with the characteristics listed above. In 
2001, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) produced a 
document suggesting ten guiding principles for good taxes, which includes some of 
the above, but not all. A 1999 discussion document entitled Towards a Better Tax 
System, published by the Tax Faculty of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW), analyses the problems in the UK taxation system. The 
system is “far too complex”, “full of anomalies”, “caught in a culture of never-ending 
change” and is “lacking in democratic control” (p. 3). The Tax Faculty document 
(pp. 4–5) suggests ten tenets for a better tax system, namely that taxes should 
be statutory (that is, enacted by primary, and not delegated, legislation), certain, 
simple, easy to collect and calculate, properly targeted, constant, subject to proper 
consultation, regularly reviewed, fair and reasonable, and competitive.
Richard Murphy, in his 2007 A Code of Conduct for Taxation, goes beyond this in 
his development of a voluntary code of behaviour based on the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (although the latter itself makes no 
reference to taxation). He develops this with the aim of addressing “organised tax 
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avoidance” (p. 2) on a global scale and deems Adam Smith’s maxims “outmoded” 
(p. 8), because they (p. 9):
...fail to recognise the obligation of the State to the citizen with 
regard to the provision of public goods, and relate primarily to the 
practice of taxation rather than the principles that underpin it.
Society now is very different from that of Smith’s time. On pp. 9–10, Murphy sets 
out a series of principles, namely that the State should: protect its citizens; provide 
public goods; not discriminate in protection/provision; democratically determine 
its provision; be unconstrained by the action of another state; and levy taxation, 
which must respect the right to hold private property; must be imposed by law; 
must not be arbitrary; and must apply to all citizens. Citizens must pay the tax due 
by them, but can appeal against it, although they must disclose all relevant data 
to the State. They do have the right to leave, in which case they lose their right 
to State protection and provision, but equally are not obliged to contribute to its 
maintenance.
If Scotland were to follow the route of independence or further devolution, it could 
be faced with the possibility of introducing a set of new taxes, which would require 
legitimation by the Scottish Parliament and acceptance by taxpayers. Care needs to 
be taken when introducing any new tax. As the UK experience of the Community 
Charge shows, it is very easy for the introduction of a new tax, however clearly 
heralded, to fail. As Smith (1991, p. 435) concludes, it was “a salutary lesson in the 
importance of designing tax schemes that enjoy widespread acceptance”.
(ii)  What practical issues arise in developing and administering a new or 
supplementary tax system, what capacities are key, and how might capacity 
requirements be met?
There are innumerable practical issues which would have to be considered 
for a new or supplementary tax system from the standpoint of tax policy and 
administration.6  Per Interviewee 5:
Thinking in broad terms about the capacity needed to deliver the 
taxes under the Scotland Act 2012, they broadly break down into 
policy capacity and administrative capacity. Both will be needed, at 
a relatively small scale, in respect of the two devolved taxes. The 
policy capacity will have elements of finance, economics and the 
law in it. An understanding of how taxes operate when applied to 
25 The Tax implicaTions of scoTTish independence or furTher devoluTion
specific economic activity such as land transactions will be needed. 
This capacity is being developed....  The key to administrative 
capacity is having staff who are trained, supported by effective IT 
systems. Existing sources of expertise have already been tapped 
into, through recruitment and secondment.
This was echoed by Interviewee 6:
To be honest, the first set of issues are about tax policy and the 
design of the taxes. Before you even think about how you would 
administer them, ... but everyone’s aware that what you choose 
to tax, and how you choose to tax it, are the things that are going 
to start you off, and they’re the fundamentals, and then you have 
to build an administrative system ...to meet the desired policy 
objective, but if you’re careful in the way you specify your policy 
objectives, then you can make the administrative part much easier.
Currently, the vast majority of tax administration is done by HMRC for the whole 
of the UK, though some responsibility has been devolved to Revenue Scotland. 
However, while HMRC has offices in Scotland, all staff across the UK deal with 
queries on a UK-wide basis, not just for the location in which they are based. There 
is a fairly wide public perception that, because HMRC has offices in Scotland, 
those offices could just transfer to being part of a Scottish tax administration under 
independence. The situation is not as clear cut as this.
Under further devolution, it might be envisaged that greater responsibility over time 
would be devolved to Revenue Scotland. However, a decision would need to be 
taken as to whether or not HMRC or Revenue Scotland would administer further 
devolved tax(es). It was a deliberate choice by the Scottish Government to set 
up Revenue Scotland to administer LBTT and Landfill Tax, as it could have asked 
HMRC to do this.
I must admit that, political considerations apart, if I had been 
deciding whether or not to set up Revenue Scotland north of the 
border or use HMRC on a sub-contract basis, I would have been 
sorely tempted to use HMRC on a sub-contract basis. The whole 
infrastructure that goes with setting up a revenue agency, I think 
is a complete nightmare. (Interviewee 14)
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The challenges under fiscal (and political) independence would be much greater. An 
independent Scotland would need to have in place an administrative infrastructure 
at national and international level able to deal with tax returns of all kinds, queries 
of all kinds and tax collection, which would involve ensuring continuity between 
existing systems and any new system or ‘add-ons’ and adequate staffing and 
training, and would require a considerable amount of resources to establish.
The task of envisaging and consulting on new taxation systems 
and then legislating for, developing, testing and implementing 
them is significant. It’s an obvious thing to say, but in practical 
terms it would be very difficult to do that for a wide range of 
taxes all at once. But it’s perfectly credible to think of reviewing 
taxes one group at a time to consider how they might be further 
developed. (Interviewee 5)
[Y]ou do have the obvious issues of the whole staffing and 
expertise and organisation of it. Revenue Scotland is still, I think, 
in single figures in terms of people and they’re aiming to get to 
between 20 and 30 people. Now, that’s fine for running a couple of 
taxes and negotiating with the Revenue about running a Scottish 
Rate of Income Tax. Going from there to setting up a 1,000 person 
tax authority or perhaps 2,000, that’s a different issue! This 
would be a major exercise and whether they just bid to take over 
Cumbernauld and Glasgow, I don’t know, but... there’s a huge 
issue there and what can be done with taking on two or three 
little taxes is fine, but then suddenly leaping, as it were, to going 
and collecting income tax or national insurance, or whatever... 
(Interviewee 10)
[They need] a collection agency with knowledge and experience... 
[otherwise] it couldn’t do the job. That’s the kind of problem that 
they’re going to have. (Interviewee 10)
It is currently felt by some, for example, that HMRC’s centralisation of services with 
the closure of local offices has resulted in local knowledge being lost (Interviewee 
9). This is set to continue with the recent announcement of the establishment of a 
digital office in Newcastle “to force taxpayers to use online services by default and 
eliminate paperwork” (AccountancyLive Update, 2014), which will replace a number 
of local offices. The capacity requirements under devolution and independence 
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might thus be very different, but this will depend on the extent of devolution and the 
choices made as to who might administer additional devolved tax(es) under that 
option.
A fully independent Scotland would also mean that a land border would be 
created between England and Scotland in a way that currently does not exist. 
A consequence of this might be a need for Scotland to re-negotiate information 
exchange agreements and double tax treaties:
Probably the main [key capacity] is international relations, if you 
like. You know, the UK has 110 tax treaties, however many we’ve 
got; we’re a member of the EU, so all the EU arrangements. 
Does Scotland just inherit that?  Presumably not automatically. 
(Interviewee 10)
Interviewees 1 and 19 expressed similar concerns. Interviewee 8 commented that 
there would be no inward investment into Scotland unless there were double 
taxation agreements in place, which “would be a huge challenge for a new 
administration”. The view of most experts interviewed was that Scotland could not 
automatically assume that existing treaties and arrangements made with the UK 
would apply. However, others have argued that an independent Scotland would 
inherit all existing treaties. This is a legal issue, where absolute clarity would need 
to be obtained, as a failure to have such international agreements in place could be 
very damaging, especially to business. The Scottish Government has made clear 
in its White Paper (Scottish Government, 2013a, p. 387) that it intends “to adhere 
to all international tax treaties in force between the UK and third party states, so 
that these treaties can continue in force between Scotland and that state”, but the 
legal situation is unclear here.7 A similar issue arises in regard to the standing of 
UK tax case law and precedent, and where any tax case might be pursued.8 Many 
VAT offences, for example, are assumed to be committed in Southend-on-Sea, as 
the VAT head office is located there. There might also be issues about the country-
identifier for VAT invoices.
A key practical issue under independence would be defining who is a Scottish 
taxpayer in terms of individuals and companies. This is currently defined in the 
Scotland Act 2012 for individuals, for the purposes of the Scottish Rate of Income 
Tax, by the main place of residence or a close connection to Scotland. This may 
cause dissension among Scotland-born individuals who are non-resident – as well 
as among non-Scotland-born individuals who do live in Scotland.
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There’s a lot of Scots south of the border who wouldn’t be pleased 
with that… and there’d be double tax issues, and what about the 
Scot who, you know, commutes from the Republic of Scotland... 
you know, all those cross border worker issues that you see in the 
tax cases in the European court... (Interviewee 12)
Adam et al. (2013, p. 26) suggest that this would create additional compliance costs 
for taxpayers as they would need to work out where they should pay tax.
There are other more specific issues which must also be considered in any future 
tax system in Scotland. For any system based on electronic filing, the issue of 
reliable access to the internet is key. With 76% of Scottish homes having access to 
the internet (lower than that UK average of 80%) (Ofcom 2013), not everybody is 
able to or will be able to access electronic filing. This does not account for those 
households which have internet access but do not feel competent or comfortable to 
file their tax returns online. This is an issue which affects any tax system, including 
the current tax system operating in Scotland as well as any future devolved or 
independent system, and the rest of the UK. It is also worth noting that HMRC’s 
issues with its current IT system have been well documented therefore having 
an effective and efficient IT system and support services are essential. Under 
independence a decision would need to be made as to whether to create a new 
IT and online filing system specifically designed to meet the needs of whatever tax 
system was to be established, or to adopt or buy-in the current HMRC system.
(iii)  What are the determining factors for a ‘new’ country designing a tax 
system?  for example, should there be a legacy approach, a new start, 
with a simpler approach or an approach to fulfil other political or economic 
objectives?
(iv)  What trade-offs or compromises arise and on what basis?
The above questions are addressed together. The reason for this is that there is 
considerable overlap between them – and also between certain practical issues, as 
a practical issue may well turn out to be a determining factor. In terms of whether 
a ‘big bang’ approach (introducing a new system all at once) or a more transitional 
approach to tax reform is appropriate, the literature is divided, and it is clear that 
there are trade-offs here too. For example, Goode (1984) suggests that incremental 
change risks missing the ‘big picture’ but is less resource intensive so has more 
chance of success. Gillis (1989) argues that it is unclear whether a ‘big bang’ or 
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incremental approach is better, whilst Sandford (1993) argues that a ‘big bang’ 
approach is appropriate as an incremental approach risks losing focus.
Something that might appear to be a sound idea – a sensible tax policy, for example 
– may be prevented from being implemented because of practical considerations 
and thus lead to a compromise or trade-off. As Interviewee 14 commented:
I’ve just been advising the... Finance Minister in [Eastern European 
country] about whether or not he should have disclosure 
provisions, and I said, ‘One of the problems is that you don’t really 
have the resources at the moment to make your existing tax 
system effective. So if you add on all these complications and you 
don’t already have proper anti-avoidance legislation…’
The formulation of tax policy is complex, as it is linked to the wider context of 
the changing legal, social and political environment, government expenditure 
programmes and economic and non-economic variables, which might have 
administrative or other practical implications. Wales and Wales (2012), in their 
report on Structures, Processes and Governance in Tax Policy-Making: An Initial 
Report, conclude (p. 7) that, in all countries considered, “the importance of tax 
policy-making is undervalued; and, largely as a consequence, it is under-resourced 
– particularly compared with other functions of government”. Any government 
must make decisions about the public services it will provide and the taxes it will 
levy to fund them. Under devolution, different policies between Scotland and rUK 
(e.g. provision of free higher education for Scottish students, free care for the 
elderly, etc.) may have, depending on the nature and extent of provision from public 
revenues, considerable implications, not least in terms of public perception of those 
policies. Under independence, this might not be the case, but other issues would 
arise, such as (Scottish rights to) the actual and potential revenue from further 
exploitation of wave power or North Sea oil and gas reserves (see Adam et al., 
2013, pp. 36–37), and in due course, the costs of decommissioning oil platforms.
The Scottish administration is going to have to decide what kind of 
social services and infrastructure it’s going to provide, how much 
that’s going to cost, and how they’re going to fund it. So if the 
Scottish social policy demands tax collection of X, the tax system is 
going to have to be able to yield X or a percentage of X in order to 
make that work. (Interviewee 9)
30 The Tax implicaTions of scoTTish independence or furTher devoluTion
It may well be that the Scottish Parliament might decide that 
they’re going to have a relatively slim level of social service, and 
therefore a relatively slim tax system. And I’m not suggesting 
that Scotland would become a tax haven, but that it might be 
very advantageous for multinationals to establish themselves. 
(Interviewee 9)
I was reading somewhere the other day that their expenditure per 
head is significantly more than the revenue per head compared 
to the rest of the UK. I must admit that I have seen conflicting 
figures, so I’m not sure which are the most accurate ones, but 
I mean, if that is the case then that’s going to present Scotland 
with a huge issue if they become fully devolved, completely 
independent, as to how they fund that. Because they’ve either got 
to borrow more, which may be difficult, spend less, which may 
be politically difficult, or raise taxes, and none of them are easy 
options. (Interviewee 16)
Often the wider context and the interplay between competing factors are not 
adequately considered, with the result that too narrow an approach to tax policy is 
adopted (see James and Edwards, 2008, pp. 35–37), and then subsequent ‘work 
arounds’ are implemented. Wales and Wales (2012, p. 7) also comment on another 
aspect of narrowness, namely that “tax policy is made and influenced by a very 
small group of people. There are too many outs and too few ins for an issue that 
affects so many people. The narrowness of the process has the potential to create 
unbalanced outcomes in the absence of other safeguards”.
While there is a considerable body of research on tax policy making and tax reform, 
two dominant themes emerge, regardless of the lens through which they are 
viewed, one being unintended adverse consequences and the second being trade-
offs (though the two may be combined). The various perspectives are considered 
below.
James and Edwards (2008, p. 37), when considering the contributions made by 
economic analysis to tax policy, for instance, point out under the ‘general theory of 
the second best’9 that:
The variables in an economic system interact so that changing 
one part will have effects on other variables that are not even 
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directly involved in the initial change. A limited analysis may fail 
to anticipate such changes, which could offset the original intended 
improvement. This can mean that a reform designed to achieve 
an economic improvement, far from actually doing so, might even 
make things worse.
For example, suppose a tax is imposed on a manufacturing process, which 
creates a lot of harmful pollutants, but where the end product itself, a medicine, 
is widely prescribed by doctors because it is the most effective treatment for 
numerous common medical conditions. The tax would increase the overall price 
of the medicine, with the likely effect that its use would decrease, people would 
be prescribed less effective medicines and need more time away from work to 
recover, with adverse effects on the economy in terms of lost production, which 
might outweigh the effects of the tax collected on the manufacturing process. 
There are obvious implications here for any government amending an existing tax 
system or setting one up de novo, in that it must consider the potential unintended 
consequences of any policies as well as those intended. Economic analysis also 
incorporates a wide body of work on optimal taxation. Optimal taxation is concerned 
basically with economic efficiency and equity/fairness. Tax structures, policies, 
systems and taxes themselves should be arranged to take account not only of 
economic efficiency but also fairness to taxpayers. Given that something that is 
economically efficient need not be fair – and vice versa – there is a balance to 
be struck here, hence a trade-off between the two concepts. The instance of the 
Community Charge referred to earlier shows an effect of an unworkable balance 
being struck, which affected both Scotland as well as the rest of the UK. As 
Interviewee 5 commented:
[T]here are trade-offs in tax policy terms between, for example, 
simplicity and fairness. Everybody wants a simple tax system 
but they also want a fair one. To give an example of a trade-off, 
a simple tax system might not include any reliefs or allowances. 
But many people would think that it wasn’t very fair to tax the 
first dollar you earn. For people on low incomes, there would be a 
perfectly fair view that they ought to keep all of their first dollar. 
So simplicity and fairness have to be balanced. There would have 
to be similar trade-offs between simplicity and the perceived 
attractiveness of a tax system to the company sector, for example, 
in giving allowances for investment expenditure.
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James and Edwards (2008, pp. 38–39) provide a useful summary of the issues 
examined by the body of work on optimal taxation:
•	 uniform	commodity	taxes	rarely	being	optimal	(Ramsey,	1927);
•	 optimal	taxation	being	introduced	only	if	acceptable	within	the	political-economic	
process (Frey, 1976);
•	 too	much	emphasis	being	placed	on	optimality	at	the	expense	of	the	process	of	
achieving it (Feldstein, 1976);
•	 the	question	of	whether	optimal	taxation	can	make	a	practical	contribution	to	
tax policy, as raised by Heady (1993) and echoed by Alm (1996), who suggested 
that issues concerning fiscal and social institutions are ignored and that it is 
impossible to consider all the complexity associated with tax systems;
•	 political	mechanisms	that	ensure	restraints	on	taxation	which	enhance	efficiency	
(Gradstein, 1999);
•	 the	marginal	tax	rate	being	lower	in	the	presence	of	tax	evasion	(Cremer	and	
Gahvari, 1994 – though this is dependent on the assumptions they make); and
•	 the	fact	that	‘sin	taxes’	on	unhealthy	items,	involving	a	return	of	the	proceeds	
to taxpayers, can increase economic welfare (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2006 – 
though this conclusion could be reached without reference to optimal taxation, 
and the authors do recognise the limitations of their particular analysis).
With existing tax systems, trade-offs between different considerations have 
developed in the light of experience over long periods. This leads to considerable 
modification of the systems to accommodate a wide variety of pressures in 
order to achieve a workable balance between those competing interests (see, for 
example, James, 1999; James and Edwards, 2008). This is the challenge which 
Scotland will face if designing a new tax system under independence. Whilst the 
Scottish Government’s (2013a, p. 122) proposal is for a new tax system based 
on the “design principles of a modern and efficient system set out by the Fiscal 
Commission”, any system will also have to make trade-offs to take account of 
competing interests.
(v)  How long would it take to implement a new tax system and what would 
happen in any transitional period?
Under further devolution it is possible that further taxes might be devolved, or 
under ‘devolution max’ that all taxes might be devolved. However it is unclear 
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whether this would provide scope to design a wholly new tax system, particularly 
as it would be constrained by existing UK tax treaties and the need to co-ordinate 
with UK tax policy to varying extent. This need would not exist under independence 
as an independent state would be free to implement any tax system required to 
pursue its own objectives, provided that this accorded with any tax treaties to which 
it were party.
The question of how long it would take to implement a new tax system depends on 
what is conceptualised as a new system. The introduction of individual new taxes 
can take a few years (as in the case of VAT, the Community Charge, and more 
recently LBTT and Scottish Landfill Tax), as can the change of administration (for 
example, the merger of the UK Inland Revenue and HM Customs & Excise in 2005 
to form HMRC). The introduction of a wholly new tax system incorporating new tax 
policy and administration would also depend on several criteria, namely:
•	 the precise nature of the system and how wide-ranging it might be; 
•	 whether it was accepted by those being taxed; and 
•	 the level of support provided by any current tax administration. 
In relation to Scotland, these criteria might be similar regardless of whether further 
devolution or independence were under consideration.
The advantages of keeping as much as possible from the existing UK system (a 
legacy approach) would be its familiarity; people would know how it worked. New 
elements might be introduced subsequently, on a phased implementation basis 
over a specified time period. For example, in Ireland, in 1922, on the creation of a 
separate state, there was a ‘lift and drop’ of existing UK tax legislation, supported 
by the presence of UK Revenue Commissioners for some 12 months (Réamonn, 
1981), which provided a basis from which to develop further Irish legislation. The 
Board of Revenue Commissioners for Ireland, when set up, followed the UK pattern 
(Réamonn, 1981, p. 41). This model seems to have been effective, despite a history 
of prior violent conflict, during which tax records were burned in an attempt to 
cripple public administration (Réamonn, 1981, p. 39). However, a ‘lift and drop’ 
approach might also bring its own problems:
Equally, you have to recognise that for a period of transition, just 
replicating what is there already is often the easiest if not the best. 
But there is the danger that if you ‘copy-and-drop’, then you get 
stuck with something for a long time because nobody wants the 
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political pain of making the change once you have a functioning 
tax system in a country. And, I mean, that’s one of the things 
that’s certainly bedevilled tax reform for a number of countries, 
including, particularly, the UK. (Interviewee 14)
Some states have begun with a ‘big bang’ approach,10 such as Israel in 1948, with 
a tax system being enthusiastically welcomed. Likhovsky (2007, p. 672) cites 
(from Cohen, 1958, p. 5 and p. 9) the recollection of a tax official, during the first 
months after independence, that there was a willingness to pay higher taxes than 
would have been paid to the British Mandate and the argument between two well-
known citizens of Haifa as to who was the first to pay income tax to the provisional 
government. Although compliance with British taxation was low, the Palestine 
Jewish community had:
...established a system of autonomous voluntary taxes designed to 
finance Jewish military expenditures in the face of growing and 
often violent Arab opposition to Jewish presence in Palestine. At 
first, these taxes were paid on a local basis, but in 1938, during 
the Arab rebellion of 1936–1939, a national organization was 
established, and progressive income and property taxes, as well as 
indirect taxes (collectively known as Kofer ha-Yishuv), were levied 
on the Jewish community. (Likhovsky, 2007, p. 671). 
There was thus a tradition of paying taxes in support of the state.
However, the increased complexity of tax systems makes a ‘big bang’ approach 
impractical. Substantial prior pilot testing/parallel running would be required if this 
were envisaged.
If it’s anything other than tax, you’d say it would be a really 
good idea to have a brand new start and have everything shiny 
and polished and ready to go on the first day and just introduce 
it, but, unfortunately, the world of tax is a bit different, and so, 
generally speaking, the last thing anybody wants is a new tax. If 
I was recommending to a minister what to do, I would say, ‘Stick 
as closely as you can to the UK model so that you should get the 
easiest possible transition’.
I would think that relying on a legacy system was probably the 
best answer, at least for a transition period. (Interviewee 14)
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An incremental approach might be adopted, that is, adoption of the legacy system to 
start with and then implementation of changes as required or desired, thus allowing 
time for testing, public acceptance, etc. It should also be borne in mind that creating 
effective tax code is a time-consuming process, so if there were a decision to 
create entirely new law, then this might take many years.
If you’re going to start writing a new tax code, the practicalities, I 
would suggest, are enormous. It would be untried, and the idea of 
starting to write law from nothing for covering a whole tax code 
– and just bear in mind the size of the UK tax code – I think that 
would keep you going until the 22nd century. (Interviewee 17)
In terms of a transition period for Scotland, there would be considerable reliance 
on HMRC as part of the process and afterwards, both under devolution and 
independence.
I think the whole thing [establishment of tax offices, appointment 
of revenue officials, and any sort of transition or handover] will be 
very problematic. (Interviewee 14)
I could envisage that Scotland would need the support of HMRC 
in some way, whether it’s as a collection arm or whether it’s for 
advice or whatever. I would imagine that won’t drop away for 
many years. (Interviewee 16)
Interviewee 16 also pointed out that the Falkland Islands, a British Overseas 
Territory with its own tax authority, is still supported by HMRC, with reference 
currently to its expertise in petroleum taxes, given ongoing developments there.
Interviewee 5 summarised the challenges succinctly:
They would certainly need a lead-in time. And, thinking about the 
importance of consulting the public and taking them with you, 
there would be a significant process of initial policy development 
followed by consultation and engagement, followed by further 
policy consideration and legislative drafting  …certainly, in an 
ideal world [you would want] to consult at each stage of that 
process. And then there is Parliamentary scrutiny and passage 
of the legislation. Then you need to sort out the administration, 
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including recruiting and training staff and building IT systems and 
testing them. Another very important factor is making sure that 
employers’ or tax agents’ systems can interact successfully with 
the tax authority’s systems. And all of that takes time.
Thus whether further devolution of taxes or developing a new tax system under 
independence is envisaged, a substantial period of time will be needed and serious 
consideration should be given to the best approach to introducing any changes.
(vi)  What are the most significant implementation issues?
(vii)  What are the key risks and what can be done to mitigate those risks?
The above two questions are addressed together as they are closely interconnected. 
In terms of any new or supplementary tax system, the key issue must be whether 
that system will deliver the desired revenue.
The key objective for a newly independent Scotland would be 
securing revenues due to it. And anything that seriously risked that 
would have to be avoided because of the profound consequences if 
revenue due was not gathered in. So, that would be a factor to be 
taken into account. (Interviewee 5)
The obvious biggest risk is – will they get the money that they 
anticipate?... That, to me, is the main risk… the other risks are 
clearly overburdening the tax authority, not communicating 
properly to the taxpayers, taxpayers being left confused and not 
knowing what to do. And, of course, in this day and age... that 
opens up, possibly, avoidance and evasion, which... remains… a 
huge risk.
In this day and age, I’m a firm believer, compared with 19th and 
20th century taxes, the population basically has to accept the 
tax and buy into it and that means communication, explanation, 
making sure that people realise it’s value for money, etc., etc. You 
can’t anymore just impose them – well, it’s a huge risk if you do. 
(Interviewee 10)
In many respects, this all boils down to the issue of getting the tax rates ‘right’ so 
as to raise sufficient revenue and getting taxpayers to pay taxes deemed due – in 
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other words, tax compliance. Scottish independence or further devolution raises 
the possibility of a different approach to tax compliance. In international financial 
management there is the phenomenon of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ whereby, in a global 
economy, financial institutions route financial transactions around jurisdictions to 
utilise regulatory regimes to their advantage – and this could include tax regulation.
However, without seriously running such risks, it is possible for Scotland to change 
the emphasis of tax compliance policy. There is a voluminous literature on tax 
compliance see, for example, Ahmed et al. (2003), Evans (2003), Fischer et al. 
(1992), Jackson and Milliron (1986), James and Edwards (2010), Kirchler (2007) 
and Richardson and Sawyer (2001). Nevertheless it is possible to outline the main 
approaches.
The OECD’s (2004, p. 37) study entitled Compliance Risk Management cites the 
analysis of James et al. (2001) in identifying two main approaches to examining 
compliance. The first of these shares the assumptions of mainstream economics, 
that taxpayer behaviour is determined by expected financial gains and losses, 
and therefore enforcement is based on the use of audits to detect, and penalties 
to punish, tax evasion. Such an approach will always be an important part of 
compliance policy but an unduly onerous tax administration may have negative 
effects. For example, both Strümpel (1959) and Schmölders (1970) reported that 
the German system was very rigid in its assessment procedures which led to an 
effective but expensive and confrontational system. A notable outcome “of the 
relatively coercive tax-enforcement techniques is the high degree of alienation from 
the state… [which] negatively influences the willingness to cooperate” (Strümpel, 
1959, p. 29).
Tax compliance is another area of tax policy where the range of factors and the 
trade-off between them are not always fully considered. The common assumption 
referred to above that taxpayers will act in a way that maximises their personal 
gains also implies that compliance costs should be minimised. However, if the 
objective of a particular tax is to deter a certain kind of behaviour, then higher 
compliance costs (and operating costs generally) might ensure that the objective is 
met. To cite Sandford et al. (1989, p. 203):
Perhaps the best that can be done is to suggest that the objective 
might be phrased in terms of minimizing operating costs in 
obtaining a given revenue from a given tax structure.
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While sometimes acknowledging the wider range of factors and interplay between 
them, researchers often focus on specifically limited aspects (e.g. Shekidele, 2001 
on excise duties in Tanzania; Serra, 2003, on tax administration costs in Chile) 
– an approach which has led to a second approach to compliance which places 
more emphasis on a wider range of taxpayer motivations and circumstances. The 
case for such a ‘behavioural’ approach is supported by evidence from research in 
behavioural economics, economic psychology and responsive regulation (see, for 
example, Alm et al., 1999; Bordignon, 1993; Braithwaite, 2003; Cowell, 1992; Cullis 
and Lewis, 1997; James, 2012c; Kirchler, 2007; Lewis, 1982; Schmölders, 1959; 
Wenzel, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b). A wider approach increasingly permeates 
the academic literature on tax compliance11 and there have been many studies that 
have considered different variables influencing compliance or non-compliance.12  
Findings tend to suggest that contact with revenue authorities and sanctions have 
an increased effect on the certainty of non-compliance, whereas tax withheld at 
source, ethics and the probability of detection maintained the same certainty effects 
and the effect of other variables was ambiguous or had decreased (peer influence 
and tax rates).
Coming out of this broader approach to looking at compliance, it has been observed 
that many taxpayers are not wholly concerned with maximisation of their personal 
gains, but can be expected to act responsibly and willingly meet their obligations 
without the need for the application of any administrative sanctions. Indeed the 
penalties for ordinary tax convictions are normally modest and the chances of 
detection small, yet most individuals pay their taxes (Posner, 2000, p. 1782). So, 
rather than proceeding on the implicit assumption that taxpayers generally are not 
to be trusted, the behavioural approach can be seen as supporting taxpayers as 
responsible citizens. This can be summarised by the compliance model developed 
in Australia and New Zealand in which it is recognised that non-compliance may 
occur for very different reasons. This is shown in Figure 3.
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figure 3 compliance model developed in australia and new Zealand
ATITUDE TO COMPLIANCE                                 COMPLIANCE STRATEGY 
 
Taxpayer decides  Use the full 
not to comply                force of the law 
 
………………………………………………………................................................. 
 
Do not want                  Deter by 
to comply                 detection 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Try to but don’t           Assist to  
always succeed            comply 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………...... 
 
Willing to do the           Make it 
right thing                easy
  
Create pressure downwards 
Source: James (2012c)
Thus, where taxpayers are determined to evade taxation, the use of the full force of 
the law is appropriate. In the case of taxpayers who are less determined to evade 
their obligations, deterrence might be the right solution. For taxpayers who are 
trying but failing to comply, more assistance is appropriate and for taxpayers who 
are willing to meet their obligations in full it should be made easy for them to do 
so. Tax administrations often follow such an approach, but tax research in recent 
years suggests there is more scope to promote compliance using behavioural 
insights. Indeed, the UK’s Behavioural Insight Team, also known as the ‘Nudge Unit’, 
which was set up in 2010 by the UK Government, has already done some work 
in this area though plenty remains to be done. Interviewee 3 commented that the 
UK Government is highlighting awareness by a ‘we know who you are’ approach, 
similar to the TV licensing campaign some years ago.
More generally, the OECD (2004, p. 8) formally describes compliance risk 
management as a “structured process for the systematic identification, assessment, 
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ranking and treatment of tax compliance risks”, such as the failure to register or the 
failure to report tax liabilities properly. The OECD outlines the way a compliance risk 
management process may be applied by a revenue authority in the following stages:
•	 identify	risks
•	 assess	and	prioritise	risks
•	 analyse	compliance	behaviour	(causes,	options	for	treatment)
•	 determine	treatment	strategies
•	 plan	and	implement	stages
In the event of further devolution of taxes, the approach to compliance would 
necessarily have to remain in keeping with the approach taken across the UK, 
whereas in the event of independence, the approach to compliance could be 
completely different, if so desired. For example, under independence a greater 
focus could be directed towards a behavioural approach or different risks could be 
prioritised.
Tax harmonisation is, of course, particularly relevant to taxation and Scottish 
independence or further devolution. The degree to which any country can 
successfully operate a tax system that is significantly out of line with other 
countries may be constrained by a series of factors such as globalisation, tax 
competition and tax harmonisation policies. Rather than defining these as risks, 
they are better thought of as influencing factors that create boundaries for any tax 
system. These will be considered briefly in turn.
Globalisation has been defined in various ways. Bhagwati (2004, p. 3) suggested 
that:
...[e]conomic globalisation constitutes integration of national 
economies into the international economy through trade, direct 
foreign investment (by corporations and multinationals) short-
term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity 
generally and flows of technology.
This, of course, has major implications for the design of national tax systems. As 
Sawyer (2004, p. 1), an international authority on such issues, observed:
With increasing globalisation of business activity, mobility of 
capital (and to a lesser degree individuals), and the blurring 
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of jurisdictional boundaries, the setting of domestic tax policy 
has taken on an increasingly international application. As a 
consequence of this international dimension, tax policy and 
practice cannot, or at least should not, be developed by a country 
in isolation of the international implications.
Globalisation requires, or perhaps forces, a high degree of consensus policy 
and appropriate mechanisms to cater for the innovations it brings, such as the 
internationalisation of financial markets. Furthermore, globalisation makes it hard to 
ascertain where a corporation or other enterprise should pay tax, which naturally 
increases the potential for avoiding disadvantageous tax regimes in particular 
countries. There is evidence that globalisation has had a significant impact on 
national tax systems. For example, Messere (2004) observed some convergence in 
OECD countries both to the level of taxation and to developments in tax structures 
and Avi-Yonah (2010) found further evidence that different tax systems had been 
converging over the period 1980 to 2010.
‘Tax competition’ describes different tax jurisdictions using tax concessions to try 
to attract businesses, investment and productive individuals to their areas. There 
is little doubt that taxation may affect all sorts of economic decisions (James and 
Nobes, 2012) including those regarding location. Therefore it is not surprising 
that countries might take account of such matters in determining their tax rates. A 
relevant recent example in the Budget of March 2013 was the further reduction in 
the UK rate of corporation tax to 20 per cent to take effect from 2015. If Scotland 
became independent, it would be able to set tax rates to take account of these 
issues and to attract investment to Scotland. If full tax powers were devolved, it 
would also have to make economic decisions about how to set tax rates, although 
these would have to take cognisance of the wider UK tax system. In practice, tax 
advantages are often not the most important factor in such business decisions and 
the predicted ‘race to bottom’ in tax rates has not taken place (see, for example, 
Plümper et al., 2009). However, tax competition is a constraint on countries 
attempting to levy taxes that are high enough to cause capital and labour to locate 
or be diverted elsewhere on a significant scale. Interviewee 2 commented explicitly 
on a change in tax level in Slovakia (a flat tax) attracting foreign direct investment, 
with the result that Slovakia now has the highest number of car manufacturers 
in the world based there; an inward investment which had significant economic 
benefits.
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European tax harmonisation might also be a factor influencing Scottish tax design. 
Nevertheless, it might be less of a constraint than might be supposed since 
progress towards harmonisation has not been as significant as some might have 
hoped. The first significant step towards European tax harmonisation was included 
in the Messina Resolution of 1955 and the Treaty of Rome of 1957 and involved the 
removal of customs duties between member states. Beyond that, initial moves were 
very cautious with provisions only for the harmonisation of legislation concerning 
turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation to the extent 
that such harmonisation was necessary for the operation of the internal market. 
Since that time there has been a series of reports, reviews and initiatives but not 
much progress because countries are often reluctant to give up control of taxation 
which, of course, provides the great bulk of their revenue and is also a powerful 
instrument of economic and social policy. This is consistent with relevant fiscal 
principles regarding public expenditure at different levels of government (see, for 
example, Tiebout, 1956 and James, 2004). Essentially different areas or regions, 
such as local authorities within the UK or member states within the European 
Union, may have different preferences regarding the level of public expenditure and 
its associated levels of taxation. There is also the possibility that different countries 
may have different preferences regarding the type of tax system they operate. In 
such circumstances a degree of autonomy would be preferable to a standardised 
approach.
There are difficulties in finding the right balance between these two perspectives 
of harmonisation and some degree of national autonomy. In EU terms the first 
of these, as stated in the preamble to the 1957 Treaty of Rome and many times 
subsequently, involves an “ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe” and a 
resolve “to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common 
action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe”. The second perspective 
flows from the principle of subsidiarity. This is laid down in Article 5(3) of the 2010 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union which states that ”in areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States”.
In terms of harmonisation, the European Commission has made it clear that tax 
policy must have the priority of supporting the four freedoms of the internal market 
– the free movement of persons, goods and capital and the freedom to provide 
services. Tax policy in the European Union must therefore “focus on the removal of 
tax obstacles to the exercise of those four freedoms” (Commission of the European 
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Communities, 2001, p. 7). There has been some debate about how this approach fits 
with the second perspective and subsidiarity. The European Commission (ibid., p. 8) 
has argued that:
There is no need for an across the board harmonisation of 
member states’ tax systems. Provided they respect Community 
rules, member states are free to choose the tax systems that they 
consider most appropriate and according to their preferences. 
The level of public expenditure is equally a matter for national 
preferences as long as this is adequately met by revenues in such a 
way that budget positions remain close to balance or in surplus.
Nevertheless, the Commission goes on to point out that the choices of member 
states in such matters do not take place in isolation. Furthermore, harmonisation is 
essential regarding indirect taxes and is specifically provided for in Article 113 of the 
consolidated Treaty on European Union because indirect taxation might provide an 
obstacle to the free movement of goods and services and distort competition.
Regarding personal income taxes, while member states in principle may make their 
own decisions, the Commission argues that it may be necessary to co-ordinate 
national tax systems to avoid obstacles to the four freedoms. There are similar 
concerns regarding business taxation. In a later communication, the European 
Commission (2006, p. 4) identified three principles for co-ordinated tax systems:
•	 removing	discrimination	and	double	taxation;
•	 preventing	inadvertent	non-taxation	and	abuse;	and
•	 reducing	the	compliance	costs	associated	with	being	subject	to	more	than	one	tax	
system.
The European Commission (2010) has produced a further communication on 
removing cross-border tax obstacles. This again pointed out that tax rules should 
not reduce the benefits of the internal market but that such a policy does not require 
member states to harmonise their tax systems in other respects. However, the 
subject continues to come up for discussion, for example, regarding responses 
to tax competition mentioned above, closer economic integration for EU member 
states generally and, more specifically, fiscal integration of the euro zone countries 
in an attempt to maintain monetary union in the form of the euro. Further economic 
integration almost certainly implies a greater degree of tax harmonisation in the 
future.
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So it is not clear quite how far and in what ways tax harmonisation might proceed. 
Indeed, there has even been difficulty in getting harmonisation of different views on 
tax harmonisation (James, 2000). It is, therefore, worth examining the dimensions 
that harmonisation might involve. Figure 4 illustrates various possibilities.
figure 4 classification of degrees of european tax harmonisation
Source: Adapted from James (1999)
Following the left hand branch all the way down indicates no harmonisation – 
different taxes, an absence of double taxation arrangements and no administrative 
co-operation. This could be mitigated with double taxation agreements and 
administrative co-operation and this is an area that has been emphasised in EU 
tax policy. Partial harmonisation could be achieved with some taxes European and 
some national. The third range of possibilities is where member states all have the 
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same main taxes but there are choices about different tax bases and tax rates in 
different countries. Given the benefits of allowing different areas to make decisions 
that suit their own needs and preferences, European harmonisation that means 
complete standardisation of taxation across the European Union would seem to 
be a very unlikely development and would certainly be undesirable. To update an 
earlier sentiment of Cnossen (1990, p. 473) regarding the European Community, 
the European Union has been created by and for the member states not the 
member states for the European Union. In the foreseeable future, European tax 
harmonisation seems unlikely to be a major constraint to likely changes to the tax 
system in Scotland following independence or further devolution.
As is clear from the above, there are many different influences upon tax 
administration and policy which create a variety of risks. However, in terms of 
policy, it is desirable to have an over-arching framework. 
[W]hat I’ve been stressing to the Government officials is, if you do 
have a policy... if somebody comes up with a question you haven’t 
thought of, you’ve got a framework by which to say, well, ‘Our 
policy is this, how does it fit in with that?’ (Interviewee 12)
The most obvious course of action would be to develop a strategy to develop policy 
and implement it, so that matters are not dealt with on an ad hoc basis (see James 
and Edwards, 2007). James and Edwards (2008, pp. 46–49) suggest a ten point 
plan for a strategic approach to tax policy, which is outlined below.
1. Identify the aims of taxation – for achieving the required range of government 
economic and social policies, with the importance of all the different aims and 
objectives being decided on (i.e. traded-off) in regard to the features it is desired 
that the tax system should display.
2. Identify different methods of achieving the aims – for example, by tax 
expenditure, by tax subsidy (or by non-tax methods, if these would be better).
3. Analyse in terms of the economic criteria – efficiency, incentives, equity, 
incidence and macroeconomic considerations.
4. Specify the administrative constraints – what can be done, both legally and 
practically.
5. Identify different risks – a multilevel assessment is needed to assess the political, 
economic, social and technological risks in the domestic and international tax 
environment, and how sensitive such risks are to change.
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6. Analyse behaviour – an assessment is needed of how people are likely to react 
and behave, which may mean that some taxes will be more acceptable than 
others and thus easier to administer and operate as resistance is less.
7. Relationship with different policies – that is, of tax policy to broader economic 
and social policies. The need to raise revenue may need to be traded-off against 
keeping tax rates low to promote economic growth. Tax policy can rarely be 
changed without impacting on other government policies as well, which thus 
may also need to be changed.
8. Develop strategies – which should be comprehensive to address wide issues, 
but sufficiently flexible to deal with particular areas.
9. Plan and implement strategies, including intended outcomes – so that resources 
are used efficiently and effectively and the various stakeholders are all ‘on 
board’. There should be intended outcomes, with a mechanism for monitoring 
and evaluating whether the strategies are working.
10. Monitor and evaluate the performance of strategies against the plan – which is 
by no means easy, given the complexity of any tax administration process. Using 
the mechanism in nine above, if strategies are not working, then they should be 
modified, or amended if circumstances have changed. It is likely that there will 
be several key performance indicators, and the entirety of the tax environment 
will need to be assessed, especially taxpayer behaviour. The results of 
monitoring and evaluation generally should be fed back into a continuous review 
of tax strategy.
The above follows the strategy principles outlined by the management scholar, 
Henry Mintzberg (2004). Its relevance as a ‘recipe’ for tax law and system change 
or de novo establishment is clear and is thus germane for the tax implications of 
further Scottish devolution or independence. However, in the light of changes 
to tax legislation and systems, consideration will need to be given to the relative 
validity and standing of existing tax case law and the costs of establishing a revenue 
infrastructure (establishing offices, training officials, collection machinery and 
mechanisms, etc.). This could also result in uncertainty (as to how particular laws, 
case law, mechanisms, etc., would apply or work) and is a further instance of 
where trade-offs might be necessary.
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(viii)  What are the insights, processes and learning points from other ‘new’ 
countries or regions which have gone through similar developments?
In the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR, 
a mixed approach was taken to developing a new tax system, with some countries 
adopting a ‘big bang’ approach and some taking a more transitional or a legacy 
approach (see Martinez-Vasquez and McNab, 1997, for further discussion). What 
is notable about these approaches is the difference between the bases from which 
they started. As Interviewee 10 commented:
Well, Eastern Europe was, of course, already starting from the 
proverbial blank sheet of paper. To a degree, Scotland is, but it’s a 
very different blank sheet.
The point is that the Eastern European countries and Scotland have very different 
histories which then influence the point from which they start. Perhaps the closest 
example to potential independence for Scotland from the rest of the UK is the split 
of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but even so, the parallels 
are limited (see Pellegrino, 2004). 
[T]he Czech and Slovak Republic and the Soviet Union, you know, 
they had been together for a relatively short period of time. In 
the case of Scotland... you’re talking about centuries, not decades. 
And I think that that’s going to shape the debate with Scotland, 
depending on what the outcome from the referendum is... Scotland 
already has quite a high degree of autonomy over its tax system, 
which is not the case in these other countries. (Interviewee 13)
[T]here are some examples in Eastern Europe, although not all 
of those are really setting up from scratch. There are examples 
of countries where the country has been split in two, like the 
former Czechoslovakia, but my understanding is that they had 
very much a federal system before the split, and so although 
there was a change in tax administration, it wasn’t an entirely 
new kind of creation. And then there are places like South Sudan 
where perhaps there are more challenges than there have been in 
Eastern Europe. (Interviewee 14)
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When these Eastern bloc countries were part of a Centrally Planned Economy 
(CPE), where governments had substantial control over all financial transactions, 
few formal taxes existed and the tax administration was limited. Legacy issues 
such as distrust of public institutions, corruption and general cynicism towards 
the government (Ickes and Slemrod, 1992; Martinez-Vasquez and McNab, 1997; 
Newcity, 1991) are less prevalent in the UK, which also has a different economic 
culture (e.g. private businesses) and a common law, not civil code legal system. 
The UK base line is somewhat different with more rigorous tax policy and tax 
administration systems in place as well as more developed legal and political 
systems. There is also a well-developed tax and financial profession. Additionally 
legacy issues are different; whilst there may be issues around public trust and 
cynicism, there are fewer issues around corruption. It is clear, however, that 
Eastern bloc countries which have decentralised have taken a long time to set up 
the necessary tiers of administration to deal with taxation at both national and local 
levels (Wetzel and Dunn, 2001).
It is unclear whether the ideal tax principles previously discussed will have 
been considered in depth in many of the countries that have experienced ‘fiscal 
decentralisation’. Dabla-Norris (2006, p. 104), researching the phenomenon across 
Eastern European and former Soviet bloc countries, comments:
A common feature of almost all transition economies is that 
they began from a legacy of a highly centralised system of 
public finances with subnational governments acting mainly as 
administrative units with little independent fiscal responsibility.
The most that is acknowledged (p. 107) is that “[c]larity, transparency, stability 
and well-defined rules of the game are paramount for achieving accountability 
that efficient and sound decentralisation requires”, no doubt similar to the “firm 
principles” deemed desirable by Rodríguez-Pose and Krøijer (2009, p. 409). 
However, it is worth repeating again that the principles set out by Smith and 
others remain relevant to the modern world in the context of further devolution or 
independence for Scotland. Tanzi and Zee (2000, p. 299) comment that developing 
countries:
With emerging markets, and especially... those that aim at 
becoming integrated with the international economy... should: 
(1) raise enough revenue to finance essential expenditures 
without recourse to excessive public sector borrowing; (2) raise 
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the revenue in ways that are equitable and that minimize its 
disincentive effects on economic activities; and (3) do so in ways 
that do not deviate from international norms.
This is supported in reference to other emerging economies, for example, China 
(see Krug et al., 2004). However, it seems clear in certain instances that states 
setting up tax regimes ‘from scratch’ have also opted for policies which have 
appeared easier. There is, for example, substantial comment on Estonia’s adoption 
of a land tax (see, for example, Malme and Tiits, 2001; Ott, 1999; Tiits, 2006).
However, not all countries have started from the same basis. Ireland’s experience 
of ‘lift and drop’ from the UK system and Israel’s experiences have been discussed 
under question (v), but many countries have been heavily influenced by their 
experiences of colonial/imperial rule.
The influence of tax designs imported from industrial countries is 
also visible in a number of cases. Jamaica has emerged from a 
British colonial heritage, while Bolivia, Columbia, and Mexico have 
sprung from Spanish colonial origins. In every case the imprint of 
colonial history is clearly discernible. The Dutch, for example, have 
left an indelible mark in the public financial structure of Indonesia, 
as have the French in Morocco. (Stewart, 2002, p. 9, citing Thirsk, 
199713)
Australia and New Zealand will have a similar history as former British colonies, but 
the situations relating to their independence were significantly different in a number 
of ways from those of contemporary Scotland. Stewart (2002, p. 3, especially 
footnote 3) also comments on the substantial body of literature available on tax 
reform projects in developing and transitional countries by reformers such as Vito 
Tanzi and Richard Bird and the influence of supra-national bodies such as the IMF, 
World Bank, OECD, etc. However, it seems fair to conclude that, in general, the 
experiences of other ‘new’ countries or regions with their tax systems provide few 
specific lessons that would be immediately applicable without qualification to the tax 
implications of Scottish independence or further devolution.
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(ix)  What are the insights, processes and learning points from federal systems, 
for example, the US or Switzerland?
Before turning to examples of federalism it is useful to examine the concept of 
fiscal federalism. Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2005) note that there is a broad 
spectrum of possibilities in a federal system from all taxes (central and local) being 
collected centrally, to all being collected locally, with a range of options in between. 
These middle options require a delicate balance between sufficient decentralised 
power and capacity within the federated states and sufficient power and capacity 
within the federal state. This balance can be struck at different points depending 
on political ideology underpinning the federation. For example, there can be shared 
tax bases where both national and sub-national government have control over tax 
policy and administration, as in the USA and Canada, or specific bases or taxes 
can be reserved to the national (India and Australia) or sub-national government 
(Switzerland) (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2005). The underpinning 
concepts of first-generation theory of fiscal federalism suggest that the main 
fiscal responsibility in a federal system remains within the federal government, 
with consideration given to which taxes should be administered by each level of 
government, and with local government primarily focused on benefit taxes or 
those that function as such (Oates, 2005). This is developed further by second-
generation theory to take account of the political drivers and incentives upon people 
(particularly state officials) and institutions, and the problems of information.
Boadway (2003) suggests that the benefits of a federal system include the ability 
to respond to local need, the potential to provide more efficient services than 
central government and to ensure social and economic equity. Bibbee (2007) 
comments that an internally coherent system of fiscal federalism requires spending 
autonomy, revenue autonomy, hardened budget constraints, credible fiscal rules 
and institutional arrangements for bargaining. Boadway (2003) also notes that a 
substantial benefit of a federated system is the existence of a central government 
which can take action to address any unintended consequences or spill-over from 
the federated arrangements, whether directly or through influencing the sub-
national government and to ensure both vertical and horizontal equity so that all 
citizens, no matter where they live, are treated equally. However, this can also be 
a challenge of a federal system as the sub-national government becomes over-
reliant on transfers from the national government to fund their spending rather than 
raising the revenue through their own taxes (Oates, 2005, citing Weingast, 1995 and 
McKinnon, 1997) or the sub-national government shifts the burden for sub-national 
programmes to the national government through the ‘fiscal commons’ and soft 
budget constraints (Oates, 2005). Jochimsen (2008) highlights the over-reliance 
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of the German Länder on the Federal Government (Bund) as one of the issues 
within the German federal system. Further consequences which arise from the 
decentralisation of authority include differences in average incomes, differences 
in fiscal capacity, spill-over benefits and costs, and fiscal externalities (Boadway, 
2003). There is also more than a suggestion that a federal system is a constraint 
upon state-level revenue maximisation (Feld et al., 2010) or economic growth 
(Hallwood and MacDonald, 2008).
As noted by Martinez-Vasquez and Timofeev (2005, p. 601), there are three 
elements which must be addressed in relation to the assignation of taxes in a 
decentralised system:
First, what level of government will be granted legal powers to 
introduce new taxes or change their structure in terms of the 
definition of tax bases and the determination of tax rates?  Second, 
how will the revenues from the different taxes be shared, if at 
all, among the different levels of government?  Third, what level 
of government will be responsible for the administration and 
enforcement of the different taxes?
Oates (2005, p. 363) suggests that, for a federal system to work well, “[an] 
economic setting of well developed and efficient markets combined with a fairly 
decentralized political system, characterized by healthy competition among 
jurisdiction” is needed.
One of the issues on which all interviewees agreed in terms of federalism was that 
it would create an enormous degree of complexity. This is typified by the comments 
of Interviewee 12:
Austria’s the same, Italy’s the same. If... I’m acting for a client 
who’s selling a business across Germany, if I get a VAT ruling 
in North Rhine Westphalia, it’s not going to do me any good in 
Hamburg or anywhere else… I have to get a ruling in each country. 
Ditto… in Italy. If I get a ruling in Gorgonzola, that’s going to do 
me no good at all in Lazio. It’s a different country. It is a different 
country. Ditto if I get one in Piedmont, it’s no good in Tuscany. 
They are countries with their own finance ministers.... But, there’s 
no reason why we couldn’t basically be a federal UK... there’s 
no reason why Scotland couldn’t be in quotes “an independent 
country within a federal United Kingdom”.
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Whether or not there could be a federated tax system within the UK is a question 
which affects more than Scotland. It is questionable whether a system could 
be established where there was a federated tax system consisting of rUK and 
Scotland, as a federated system is predicated on parity between the states and 
creating parity between rUK and Scotland might be challenging, given the history 
of the creation and implementation of the union. Also relevant is the issue that both 
Wales and Northern Ireland already have some level of devolved responsibility for 
taxation, therefore would the federation be between Scotland and rUK or between 
Scotland, England, Northern Ireland and Wales?  This raises the question, which is 
beyond the scope of this research, of whether a move to create a federated system 
would require a complete reworking of the current UK tax system and the wider 
political system. As Interviewee 2 remarked:
I don’t think that it’s possible to look at a federal system for the 
UK/Scotland because the power relationship is different. In a 
federal system each party is equal, but in the UK the power 
relationship is unbalanced. It’s a different power relationship.
There are also issues in relation to English consent, for example 
Scotland couldn’t have influence on monetary policy because that 
would need English consent therefore it couldn’t be a federated 
system. There comes a point when it becomes impossible to 
manage even though we’re good at managing the differences 
across the UK.
A key issue in terms of federalism is the process by which this is achieved. The 
more usual approach is for smaller national units to join together into a federated 
group, not for a larger national unit to break up into smaller ones. As Interviewee 16 
commented:
I think the issue with... Switzerland and Germany as I understand 
it [is] they... grew up and merged at a federal level, whereas 
here we’re going in the opposite direction, which I think is quite 
different.
The dynamic of the process by which Scotland and the rest of the UK might form a 
federation is therefore different from what might be considered the ‘norm’.
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(x)  What are the educational (professional and public) needs to support a new 
system?
As is implicit from the prior discussion, taxpayers’ commitment to and acceptance 
of tax changes are key to their success – though people in general do not much like 
change.
[I]t’s fair to say that people don’t like change, but if the change 
is handled correctly I don’t think that that is a huge issue. 
(Interviewee 8)
One of the valuable things that supports acceptance of change is, as Interviewee 
5 commented, that there is “in a modern society... a culture of compliance”. This 
is not always the case for a new system or a new country. Likhovsky (2007) 
comments, in relation to the establishment of Israel as a new state, on the different 
attitudes to paying tax held by its influx of new citizens post-1948, dependent on 
their national origin. For many, non-payment of tax was the norm, as part of a life 
style or culture which kept them out of sight of government authority. A massive 
education programme was implemented to change attitudes.
Several of the interviewees commented that there is a considerable role for the tax 
profession in helping taxpayers get to the ‘right’ tax bill.
[I]f [tax] authorities are planning changes, then they really ought 
to get real and bring the professionals on board and enlist their 
aid. And, yes, Scotland may have got there already but not all tax 
authorities recognise professionals. Some view the tax profession 
as, sort of, leeches to be side-stepped, or whatever, but, like it or 
not, the professions are there and the reason people use the tax 
professional is usually because they’ve got better things to do. 
It’s not as, perhaps the newspapers or many politicians believe, 
solely... so you can rip off the tax authority. Most of tax work... 
I’ve always argued is compliance, i.e. getting to the right tax bill, 
therefore, the tax professionals have a lot to offer in trying to 
make sure it [the system]... continues to operate. (Interviewee 10)
Communication to taxpayers and tax professionals is “absolutely key” (Interviewee 
9), with websites being very important:
I think there would have to be a huge investment in websites and 
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that kind of thing, web-based information. These days you can’t 
do anything on any scale without having really good web-based 
systems, and it took HMRC, as I’m sure you know, several years 
to improve e-filing, and all the signalling that goes with that... 
(Interviewee 14)
[T]hese days, there’s an expectation that things will be online 
and available round the clock, that there’s good access to 
information, as well as payment systems, so communications 
is a huge practical issue. That needs to be managed well and 
you need to make provision for the people who can’t get online. 
There is also a choice between something you intend to be 
seamless to the taxpayer, something like PAYE, where people are 
often barely aware of it, versus a system that requires people 
to engage personally with the tax system, and having a clearer 
understanding of what they’re paying and what that tax pays for. 
That is perhaps more a philosophical than a practical issue, but it 
has practical implications. (Interviewee 6)
Such websites are complicated to build and difficult to get right. Also:
People will need access to the law; these days, people expect 
to have that available online. I guess Scottish law probably is 
available already on the web and, obviously, that becomes more 
important the more that it covers. The Scottish Government will 
have to issue guidance notes and regulations and guidelines and 
explanatory leaflets and all this sort of stuff. And that’s all fine 
when you have a system that does that, and when you’ve been 
building it up for several years, perhaps many years; but it’s really 
challenging, I believe, to do it from scratch. (Interviewee 14)
In a way it’s an opportunity to start again on the educational side, 
because, again, we know in the UK there are so many people that 
don’t understand their obligations under the tax rules. In Scotland 
in a way they’ve got the opportunity to start now, starting to 
educate people as changes are made, you know, and why not bring 
it into the national curriculum to ensure that people at least have a 
basic understanding and awareness? (Interviewee 16)
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The provision of information will need to be considerably in advance of any changes 
being implemented – and such information will need to be easily comprehensible 
to ‘the man in the street’. Often tax guidance notes and guidelines are not easily 
understood. It is also the case, of course, that where tax systems are changed, the 
educational needs and the costs of meeting them are likely to be substantial.
[I]f there’s… new legislation…the amount of research and training 
time… is huge. (Interviewee 19)
The Scottish Government has already engaged extensively with tax and other 
professionals in relation to implementation of LBTT and Landfill Tax. This is a model 
that would be very helpful for future development, as educational and publicity 
needs, etc., will be similar, regardless of whether devolved taxes or changes under 
independence are under consideration, although the scale of changes would be 
different.
The timing of any information provision is also of great importance. Providing 
information in sufficient time to allow taxpayers and professionals to prepare 
appropriately is key, but this should not be done before details of the tax or the 
administration are complete, to prevent concerns about uncertainty.
Agents need to be updated on a monthly or quarterly basis. 
They can backup information to clients i.e. perform an educative 
role. For example you need to focus on the audience and timing. 
(Interviewee 3)
(xi)  What would a new system of incentives or penalties to support compliance 
look like?
The response to questions (vi) and (vii) inherently addressed many of the issues 
concerning incentives or penalties to support compliance. However, as
Interviewee 14 commented:
[A]t the very heart of any revenue agency is the ability to identify 
and register and subsequently tax all the people who ought to 
be paying tax. In a fully cooperative transfer of powers and 
responsibilities, you would expect all of the taxpayer registration 
information to go straight across from HMRC to Revenue 
Scotland. But if for some reason that didn’t happen, then you 
would have a very big issue about identifying all the taxpayers 
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because, effectively, you’d be starting from a clean piece of paper 
in the most unappealing way. And you’d have to... effectively have 
some kind of tax census in order to identify people, and, clearly, 
there would be an opportunity for some to slide through the cracks 
in the floorboards.
Changes to a tax system involving transfer of information might result in a number 
of taxpayers escaping the tax net, so there is a risk of evasion. Depending on the 
nature of changes to the law, there may also be an increased risk of avoidance. 
Tax evasion and avoidance are issues which affect tax administrations worldwide, 
whether old or new. There is an extensive academic and professional literature 
on tax avoidance and evasion. While there may be many definitions possible of 
tax evasion and tax avoidance, most people familiar with the terms would have no 
difficulty in accepting those put forward by Simon James (2012a) in his Dictionary 
of Taxation:
Tax evasion is the illegal manipulation of one’s affairs with the 
intention of escaping tax. It is traditionally contrasted with legal 
avoidance of taxation. (p. 98)
However, tax evasion would also include the tax lost from the hidden economy, also 
referred to commonly as the ‘black’ or ‘shadow’ economy, estimated as worth in 
excess of £2bn per annum in the UK (Herald, Scotland, 2008). There are no reliable 
figures for tax loss in transition economies.
Tax avoidance describes the rearrangement of a person’s affairs, 
within the law, in order to reduce tax liability. (James, 2012a, p. 
23)
Freedman (2004, p. 336), also defines the latter term similarly as comprising “all 
arrangements to reduce, eliminate or defer tax liability that are not illegal”.
The ways and means of tax avoidance are varied. They range from non-contentious 
means,14 through ‘post-event damage limitation’,15 preventative means16 and use 
of the law to develop contentious schemes, which exploit the form of the law in 
violation of its intention, spirit or substance.17 Many books inherently suggest that 
this type of use of the law began with the 1929 case of Ayrshire Pullman Services 
and D.M. Ritchie v CIR or that of IRC v Duke of Westminster in 1936, but ‘schemes’ 
go back many years (see Ferrier, 1981). However, notable cases of tax avoidance 
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in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are characterised by the use 
of schemes (the cases of Ramsay (W.T.) Ltd v CIR and Furniss v Dawson being 
typically cited examples of this). Thus, another way of judging whether taxpayer 
behaviour constitutes avoidance is whether it is within the spirit as well as the letter 
of the law (see James et al., 2001). However, this rather begs the question as to 
what actually is the spirit of the law, as this is a nebulous and ill-defined concept. 
Trying to use it to judge tax behaviour could thus undermine the principle of 
certainty, which is a fundamental principle (see earlier).
The distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion is clear in legal, if not in 
practical, terms, with phrases like ‘tax avoision’ (Seldon, 1979) being coined to 
describe the grey area between the two. Revenue authorities may counter such 
activities from a number of different standpoints, namely: 
•	 the	‘spectrum	or	line’	approach,	where	a	boundary	is	set	beyond	which	activity	
will be challenged (see Broadbent, 2003); 
•	 the	‘smell’	test,	where	transactions	are	legal	but	offend	the	tax	authorities	(as	in	
avoidance schemes); and 
•	 what	revenue	authorities	might	want	to	achieve,	as	set	out	in	an	online	version	of	
HMRC’s International Tax Handbook in 2007:
…[T]he expression ‘tax planning’…embraces a wide range of 
options from those which are merely ‘mitigatory’ to those which 
we would regard as ‘avoidance’… [F]ine distinctions between 
‘tax planning’ and ‘tax avoidance’ are seen as being of less 
consequence than the overall effect on the yield to the Exchequer. 
This is particularly so where the apparent result is not in 
accordance with Parliament’s intentions or which would not have 
been, had Parliament addressed itself to the particular issue.
It is generally thought that the implementation of the Disclosure of Tax Avoidance 
Schemes (DOTAS) in the UK in Finance Act 2004 has filtered out the most 
contentious tax schemes before they are even instigated. A further weapon against 
avoidance will be seen in the introduction of the General Anti-abuse Rule (GAAR) 
(Aaronson, 2011), which will attempt both to re-define the ‘line’ to distinguish tax 
avoidance from tax planning and provide a lens through which to view and interpret 
the wider body of tax legislation in the way explicitly set out in the International Tax 
Handbook cited above. However, neither the GAAR nor DOTAS can address the tax 
arbitrage problems whereby multinational firms structure themselves to derive tax 
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advantages from the interplay of different tax jurisdictions’ laws. Such problems 
are currently the UK Government’s focus in its scrutiny of Amazon, Starbucks and 
Google (see Barford and Holt, 2012).
As it is so difficult to legislate against tax avoidance, various governments in recent 
years have tried to change public attitudes by a change of terminology or by playing 
the ‘moral outrage card’. This began noticeably in 1997. Peter Wyman, then Head of 
Tax at Coopers and Lybrand (as was), summarised a development that was clearly 
in accordance with the intention of the UK Chancellor, Gordon Brown, to attack tax 
avoidance.
Customs & Excise appears now to use the term ‘legitimate 
avoidance’ to distinguish between what they clearly believe to be 
‘illegitimate’ avoidance and ‘the legitimate desire to organise affairs 
in a tax efficient way’. These deliberate attempts to confer an aura 
of illegality to a legitimate activity are dangerous, and should not be 
allowed to continue unchallenged. (Wyman, 1997, p. 3)
Depending on any given means of avoidance, it might be these days categorised as 
‘unacceptable’, ‘illegitimate’, ‘illegal’ or ‘abusive’. ‘Illegitimate’ and ‘illegal’ appear odd 
semantically if avoidance itself remains a legal concept. More recently, there have 
been calls for people and companies to pay their ‘fair share’ of taxation, and the UK 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in his 2012 Budget speech referred to tax avoidance 
as being “morally repugnant” (Krouse and Baker, 2012). Reduced tax revenue in 
government coffers, resulting from tax avoidance, means reduced expenditure on 
public goods and services (e.g. unemployment benefits, hospitals, policing, roads, 
etc.), which may be seen as unethical.
The issues for Scotland here are manifold, but the basic question would be, under 
either further devolution or independence, just how much of what might be called 
the ‘tax avoidance’ legacy Scotland might wish to retain in terms of applicable 
case law, legislation, DOTAS, GAAR, etc. It would be difficult to separate elements 
out. For example, a GAAR drafted in the specific context of the UK’s body of tax 
legislation might not fit well with differently drafted legislation, and if deemed 
desirable, might need to be written anew. However, combating tax avoidance is an 
issue which Scotland perceives a need to address. For example, Isobel d’Inverno, 
the Director of Corporate Tax at Brodies LLP, and the Law Society of Scotland’s Tax 
Committee Convenor, interviewed in the Scottish Legal News (22 January 2014)18 
commented that “[t]he philosophy underpinning Scotland’s taxation plan is both a 
59 The Tax implicaTions of scoTTish independence or furTher devoluTion
vigorous approach to collecting tax and a trenchant attitude towards tax avoidance”.
Interviewee 16 commented that if Scotland got its compliance approach right, then 
it would be unlikely to have a significant tax gap and:
For Scotland, I think, to some extent, especially when, as they get 
on to areas like income tax, they have got the opportunity to make 
the base wider, i.e. by having fewer reliefs and exceptions, etc., 
and as a consequence potentially having a lower tax rate, which 
then makes the incentive to avoid tax, evade tax, less attractive.
However, a large difference between tax rates in Scotland and England might lead 
to people moving across the border, especially if substantial amounts of tax were 
involved. Interviewee 12 commented that, while human behaviour might be changed 
through the use of the tax system:
...the thing is, the politicians keep making the mistake of thinking 
people will behave nicely. But they don’t, they just behave in the 
most greedy, selfish, miserable way they possibly can.
In addition, as a result of changes, there might be different views held as to the 
legitimacy of Scottish authorities’ right to impose and collect tax, and so might 
actually foster avoidance and evasion.
And it isn’t necessarily a given that everyone would see an 
independent Scottish Government as being just as legitimate as 
a tax collector as Westminster and HMRC are. And you could see 
that there might be a greater number of people who might decide 
that there was an opportunity to game the system, partly because 
they would perceive, rightly or wrongly, that... the new taxing 
agency had less experience than its predecessor and was therefore 
less likely to notice some errors or omissions. 
There might be a small group of people who had felt it was 
reasonable to follow the law in the days when it came from 
Westminster... who might not necessarily think that the Scottish 
Government was a good thing and that therefore evading their 
taxes was almost a moral duty rather than an act of defiance and 
entirely illegal. (Interviewee 14)
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5. discussion and conclusions
The tax implications of Scottish independence or further devolution are many and 
complex, as confirmed in the interviews with leading experts. Furthermore, many of 
these issues have not perhaps been as fully explored in the public domain as they 
might have been. The Scottish Government (2013a) states that “the UK tax system 
is complex and inefficient” (p. 118) and that it intends to develop a new tax system 
for Scotland “based on the design principles of a modern and efficient system” (p. 
122). This is an appropriate starting point, though there are powerful forces that 
result in modern tax systems often being far from aligned with such principles. 
In practice other issues may be considered a higher priority than operating the 
most ‘efficient’ tax system possible – the issue of fairness being one of the most 
important. Furthermore, the complexity of modern tax systems is often the result 
of the underlying complexity of a wide range of domestic socio-economic and 
international pressures that may influence the development of tax policy. There 
are processes that may help establish a comprehensive approach to tax policy 
and administration in a complex and changing environment. One of these is the 
risk management process regarding tax compliance that has been developed for 
tax authorities by the OECD (2004). Another is a suggested ten point plan for 
developing a strategic approach to tax policy which takes account of the different 
aims, circumstances and risks involved.
More generally, this project set out to clarify the issues by focusing attention on a 
series of specific questions. The starting point is that where there are significant 
differences in the preferences or circumstances of populations in different regions 
within a country, there may be a case for at least some local control over public 
expenditure and taxation. This is even more likely to be true in the case of a country 
such as Scotland. To some extent, of course, this has already been recognised. 
Council Tax is, of course, devolved throughout the UK and the Scotland Act 2012 
permits the Scottish Parliament to set a Scottish Rate of Income Tax (HMRC, 2012) 
and it will be responsible for Land and Buildings Transactions Tax (replacing Stamp 
Duty Land Tax in Scotland) and Scottish Landfill Tax. The Scotland Act 2012 also 
provides powers for new taxes to be created in Scotland and for additional taxes to 
be devolved.
The first of the questions posed in this study was ‘is the current UK tax system 
fit for purpose for modern Scotland?’ – an obvious starting point, given that 
Scotland at the date of writing (March 2014) remains subject largely to the same 
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tax system as the rest of the UK. On most criteria and from the responses of those 
interviewed for this study, it seems reasonable to conclude that the UK system 
works reasonably well but there is room for improvement, given the volume and 
complexity of UK tax law, characterised by multiple tax rates, a lack of coherence 
in the tax base and discrimination between different kinds of economic activity. 
There have been many suggestions in different countries that tax systems should 
be based on sound principles such as simplicity, neutrality, stability and flexibility. 
However, as suggested above, all tax systems deviate considerably from such 
principles for a range of important reasons, and there is often a trade-off between 
these principles. Simplicity is often traded off against equity, resulting in a more 
complex system – but a more complex tax system can better differentiate between 
taxpayers’ individual situations and between different government policies, 
though there is frequently a misunderstanding of what ‘tax simplicity’ means. The 
importance of equity is vividly illustrated by the example of the Community Charge 
in Scotland and rUK. Key conclusions to draw here are that the imposition and 
introduction of new (or reformed) taxes or a tax system should be informed by 
the principles of ‘good’ tax design and require legitimation and acceptance by the 
populace.
Question 2 concerned the practical issues that would arise in developing and 
administering a new or supplementary tax system. Many such issues would need 
to be addressed. Key factors would be ensuring an administrative infrastructure, 
with adequate numbers of appropriately trained staff, supported by effective IT 
systems – and with HMRC involvement (possibly sub-contracting HMRC staff) to 
guarantee continuity between ‘old’ and new’ systems. A significant issue under 
independence would be to clarify what would happen as regards double tax treaties, 
information exchange agreements, the standing of UK case law, etc. Currently 
there is considerable uncertainty in legal terms as to whether double tax treaties 
and other international agreements would need to be re-negotiated: as they stand 
they exist between the UK (with Scotland being an integral part of the UK) and 
other countries. This would be crucial for business. Given that a border would exist 
between Scotland and rUK, another key issue is to determine where individuals and 
companies are resident for tax purposes.
Questions 3 and 4 related to the design of a tax system for a ‘new’ country. Once 
again, it is certain that a system designed on fundamental principles would be 
subject to a wide range of considerations and trade-offs between competing 
priorities and issues, especially in terms of equity and efficiency. The literature is 
divided between whether a ‘big bang’ approach or a more transitional approach 
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is more appropriate with suggestions being made that incremental change risks 
both missing the ‘big picture’ and losing focus while admittedly being less resource 
intensive. Establishing how such factors might play out in a Scottish context would 
require a comprehensive approach to the issue, taking account of how frequent 
changes in the legal economic and political environment, in government expenditure 
programmes and in economic and non-economic variables might affect tax policy 
in terms of such trade-offs and the likelihood of unintended consequences. Indeed, 
how far a separate Scottish tax system or increased devolution could achieve and 
maintain a system that is in practice noticeably better in these respects than those 
in other countries is an interesting point. However, it may be possible for Scotland 
to do so, if it gave such an aim a higher priority than other considerations that are 
involved in developing tax policy.
Question 5 asked how long it would take to implement a new tax system and 
what would happen in any transitional period. This depends, of course, on 
the changes proposed. The basic options are a legacy approach, retaining a 
substantial proportion (if not all) of existing taxes and of the current system; a 
‘big bang’ approach to implementing new taxes/system; or some kind of gradual 
or incremental phasing in of new taxes/system. However, the literature reviewed 
and interview data suggest that there is a case for incremental change rather than 
a ‘big bang’ approach, given the wide range of implications of making immediate 
tax changes in modern open economies. Such changes would have to work 
immediately with effectiveness and efficiency, which would imply a need for 
massive, inherently costly, prior pilot testing or parallel running. Drafting a workable 
tax code is time-consuming, can take years to implement and requires experienced 
and trained staff and a supportive infrastructure (administration, IT, etc.). It is 
difficult to see how this might be achieved without ongoing support from HMRC 
for a considerable period of time. Even so, the extent of unforeseen problems may 
still not be sufficiently clear at the outset. An incremental approach will mean that 
problems will be more manageable as they will not all occur at once.
Implementation issues and the risks involved were the subjects of questions 
6 and 7. Key risks in respect of any changed system are whether the desired 
level of revenue will be raised (with a consequential impact on the level of public 
services that can be funded); and whether the population will accept the changes, 
especially the rates of taxes. Thus compliance is a major issue and there are 
different views on the best approach to be taken. A system may adopt an inherently 
deterrent approach with severe penalties for non-compliance on the assumption 
that individuals will act to maximise their gains; or it may adopt an approach based 
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on insights from behavioural research that suggest that most individuals want to 
act, and will act, responsibly, if tax authorities themselves behave in a way that 
encourages this ‘co-operative compliance’. There are also global risks, in terms of: 
•		harmonisation,	as	any	new	or	changed	tax	system	will	need	to	interface	
effectively with that of other countries given the level of integration that exists 
between different national economies; 
•		globalisation,	giving	rise	to	concerns	as	to	where	individuals	and	businesses	
actually ‘belong’ and should pay tax; and 
•		tax	competition,	whereby	tax	concessions,	including	lower	tax	rates,	may	be	used	
to attract business, investment and productive individuals to particular countries. 
This raises questions of the extent to which the tax system in Scotland could be 
significantly different from those of other countries without incurring adverse 
economic effects in the form of undesirable changes to patterns of expenditure or 
the flows of labour and capital.
Question 8 turned to other countries that had experienced similar developments 
in taxation. It is not easy to find experiences that closely resemble the particular 
circumstances of Scottish independence or further devolution. Former UK colonies 
of substantial size gained independence well before tax administrations took on 
many of their modern characteristics. The transition economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former USSR had experienced very different economic 
and political circumstances which meant some had no choice but to adopt the ‘big 
bang’ approach. A lack of administrative infrastructure, distrust of government 
and public institutions, corruption and a need for swift, practical solutions drove 
tax developments in ways which would not necessarily be applicable to the 
Scottish situation. Similarly, legacy systems may or may not be useful where new 
sovereign states emerge from violent conflict. There is no one model for adopting 
or developing a new tax system: each country is unique.
Question 9 concerned the learning points from federal systems. This is not 
immediately applicable to the UK system which does not, of course, have a federal 
system and which does not fit the model of either Scottish independence or 
further devolution. While a federal system creates a potential to respond to local 
needs, it can also lead to over-reliance on transfers from a national government for 
funding rather than on sub-nationally generated revenues. Federalism also creates 
a considerable degree of complexity and a potential for different tax rules to be 
developed which could be detrimental to consistency and clarity. A fundamental 
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issue here is the process by which federalism might be achieved. The more usual 
approach is for smaller national units to join into a federated group (not vice versa), 
which has implications for the balance of power between federated parties, as all 
are (in theory) equal. In theory a federal system would be possible in a Scottish/rUK 
context and would address other concerns, such as currency union. However the 
creation of a federation raises wider issues for Scotland and rUK than just tax.
The next issue explored by question 10 is the educational needs, both professional 
and public, that would be required to support a new system. Clearly the extent of 
such needs depends on the nature and the scope of the changes proposed, but the 
view expressed in the interviews is that they would be considerable. Taxpayers’ 
commitment to and acceptance of changes will again be significant in their 
successful implementation, although it should be noted that the UK basically has 
a culture of tax compliance (which some states (both old and new) do not have), 
supported by a tax profession that plays an important role in fostering compliance. 
Given the means by which information is now disseminated, it would be expected 
that extensive investment in robust websites would be required to consult 
individuals, businesses and tax professionals and keep people abreast of changes 
ahead of and during their implementation. A crucial point is ensuring that as 
many people as possible understand changes and the consequences for their own 
behaviour, as often material designed for guidance purposes remains very technical 
and is not easily understood by non-experts, which reinforces points already made 
about tax simplicity.
Question 11 asked what a new system of incentives or penalties to support 
compliance would look like. This built on responses to questions 6 and 7. Key issues 
would be ensuring that taxpayers do not ‘slide through the cracks’ in any transfer 
to new taxes and/or a new system and preventing evasion. Prevention of avoidance 
would also be a key aim and is tied into measures already referred to previously 
to ensure compliance, such as retaining or setting a tax rate which does not 
encourage people to move across the border or ‘game the system’ by inappropriate 
behaviour. As Scotland is likely to be affected by the same sort of avoidance issues 
that now affect all countries, a wider issue is raised of how far Scotland would wish 
to retain the UK’s ‘tax avoidance legacy’ in terms of legislation, case law, DOTAS 
and a GAAR,  and whether reducing opportunities for tax avoidance might also 
reduce the financial attractiveness of Scotland as a country in which to work or 
invest, etc. In the interviews it was questioned whether some taxpayers might feel 
less willing to comply with a new Scottish revenue authority than they have done 
with HMRC.
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In summary, this Report indicates that the tax implications of Scottish independence 
or further devolution are more complex than may be widely thought. The 
principles of good tax design are a helpful guiding light in the process of tax 
reform. Nevertheless, there are many factors that should be taken into account 
in developing new taxes and administrative arrangements if they are to be 
successfully introduced. This has been ably described by Bird and Oldman (1990, p. 
3) when they suggested that the best approach to tax reform is one that takes:
...into account taxation theory, empirical evidence, and political and 
administrative realities and blends them with a good dose of local 
knowledge and a sound appraisal of the current macroeconomic 
and international situation to produce a feasible set of proposals 
sufficiently attractive to be implemented and sufficiently robust 
to withstand changing times, within reason, and still produce 
beneficial results.
Many of the issues arising under further devolution or independence will be the 
same: the difference will be the degree or scale. For example, under ‘devo-max’, as 
all tax powers would be devolved, in tax terms there would be only a small degree 
of difference between this and independence. If, however, only a few more small 
taxes were devolved (e.g. air passenger duty, a ‘plastic bag’ tax etc.), then there will 
be a significantly greater difference between this and independence. If Scotland 
became independent and adopted a legacy approach, this might result in minimal 
changes. The tax implications and potential are thus dependent in the first place 
on the degree and extent of Scotland’s separation from the UK and in the second 
on what is possible, desirable and achievable, given the degree of separation 
implemented.
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endnoTes
1 See also Scotland Act 2012 – frequently asked questions (HMRC).
2 There were several options originally envisaged, ranging from “a position 
of ‘devolution max’ – full fiscal autonomy within the UK; creating enhanced 
devolution; assigning revenues to the Scottish Parliament; [and] continuing with 
or marginally changing the current framework” (Aitken, 2010, p. 14).
3 Smith’s distinguished forerunners, such as Thomas Hobbes and William 
Petty, as well as his contemporaries and successors, all made a significant 
contribution to tax theory, for example, writers such as John Locke, Samuel 
Johnson, David Hume, Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, Jeremy Bentham, 
Lord Kames, Sir James Steuart, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo and John 
Stuart Mill. Of equal significance are European theorists, such as Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Denis Diderot, Montesquieu, Voltaire, etc., American 
thinkers, such as Benjamin Franklin and more modern writers, for example, 
E.R. Seligman, Joseph Schumpeter, etc. (see Frecknall-Hughes, 2007 and 
2014 (forthcoming)). However, the constraints of space preclude here any 
detailed discussion of the various theories of taxation, which include social 
contract theory (Locke, 1690) – the idea that tax was something paid in return 
for protection from the state via a voluntary alienation of rights; custom and 
pragmatism (Hume, 1748, 1752); benefit theory (Smith, 1776; Paine, 1791, 1792); 
and the concept that tax can only be imposed by law (Bentham, 1793, 1794, 
1795, 1798 and c. 1798: Bentham’s thoughts on the subject are spread across a 
number of different works (see Steintrager, 1977; and Dome, 1999)).
4 The extent to which unpopular taxes have played a role in revolts, rebellions and 
wars is well charted by Burg (2004).
5 Taylor, C.J. (2006), Beyond 4100: A Report on Measure to Combat Rising 
Compliance Costs Through Reducing Tax Law Complexity, Sydney: Taxation 
Institute of Australia.
6 However, depending on the way forward, significant legal provisions would need 
to be put in place first. If further devolution were to be implemented, it would 
require additional UK Parliamentary legislation to allow the Scottish Parliament 
to set policy as it saw fit within the confines of devolved powers. Under 
independence, the Scottish Parliament would have the power to start from a 
‘blank sheet’ if it so chose.
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7 Where one state secedes from another and becomes independent, the seceding 
state usually issues a declaration saying that it will be bound by the existing 
(tax) treaties/agreements that were binding on that other. However, there is no 
onus on the parties which had formed agreements with that other to accept this 
and ‘extend’ such agreements to the seceding state. However, in practice this 
commonly occurs until such time as the seceding state is able to re-negotiate 
its own treaties/agreements with these parties. The bargaining power of a 
seceding state in such circumstances would be an unknown quantity. In theory, 
an independent Scotland would require a double tax agreement with rUK, but 
this might be implemented initially by means of both states’ domestic law. 
8 UK tax case law is, however, used as precedent (persuasive, if not binding) in 
other common law countries, such as the Republic of Ireland, so it might well 
remain persuasive in an independent Scotland. Interviewee 7 commented that 
this would be helpful in terms of continuity, unless completely new provisions 
were put in place.
9 This theory states that it “is not true that a situation in which more, but not all, 
of the optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or is even likely to be, 
superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled” (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956, 
p. 12, cited by James and Edwards, 2008, p. 37).
10 See also under question (viii).
11 See James and Edwards, 2008, p. 42, on the various compilations of research 
on tax compliance.
12 Jackson and Milliron (1986) considered 14 main variables which influence non-
compliance: age, gender, education, income level, type or nature of income and 
whether tax is withheld at source, occupation, peer influence, ethics, fairness, 
complexity, revenue authority contact, probability of detection, sanctions and tax 
rates. Further work by Richardson and Sawyer (2001) reviews an additional 43 
compliance studies in the context of the Jackson and Milliron study. Richardson 
and Sawyer also consider research on five additional variables – compliance 
costs, tax preparers, framing, positive inducements and tax amnesties – and 
report a mixed effect on compliance. There are many further variables which 
have been considered: tax morale (Torgler, 2007); cultural influences (Coleman 
and Freeman, 1997); the implications of different political systems (Pommerehne 
et al., 1994); appeals to taxpayers’ consciences (Hasseldine and Kaplan, 1992) 
and emotions of guilt and shame (Erard and Feinstein, 1994); positive help for 
taxpayers (Hite, 1989), such as use of television material (Roberts, 1994); use of 
different forms of communication (Hasseldine et al., 2007); consideration of the 
benefits received from government expenditure (Falkinger, 1988), etc.
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13 Thirsk, W. (1997), Tax Reform in Developing Countries, World Bank e-library. 
[Online]. Available at URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-3999-0. [Accessed 
30 January 2014].
14 Such as not buying a good or service on which an excise was imposed; 
achieving tax-free income by investing in products like Individual Savings 
Accounts (ISAs) which legislation specifically decrees to be non-taxable; and 
taking the prophylactic steps allowed by inheritance tax legislation to ensure the 
devolution of property between generations of a family (currently deemed to be 
acceptable tax planning). 
15 Such as when a transaction potentially liable to tax may be retrospectively 
claimed to be non-taxable. For example, before the introduction of capital gains 
tax in the UK, individuals not infrequently would try to claim that a sale of a 
good/asset had generated a capital, rather than a trading, profit, as a capital 
profit was then not taxable and a trading profit was.
16 As in the bricking up of windows to avoid the window tax levied in the years 
1696–1851 (Dowell, 1884, p. 168). It was not illegal to brick up a window, 
although bricking up of hearths and chimneys as a way round the very 
unpopular hearth or chimney tax (1662–1688) was illicit (Marshall, 1936).
17 On what exactly the term ‘spirit of the law’ might mean, see Freedman, 2011.
18  In an article entitled Women in the law: Isobel d’Inverno.
19 This is now proposed in the Revenue Scotland and Tax Powers Bill (2013) 
SP Bill 43. Formal responses to consultation on tax management legislation 
is currently ongoing (see http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/
Finance/scottishapproach/revenuescotland).
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appendix 1  currenT Tax revenue (excludinG 
norTh sea revenue): scoTland 2011–121
Scotland 
£ million
Scotland % 
of total non-
North Sea 
revenue
UK  
£ million
Scotland as 
% of UK
Income tax2 10,790 23.3% 146,588 7.4%
Corporation tax (excl North Sea) 2,976 6.4% 32,900 9.0%
Capital gains tax 246 0.5% 4,336 5.7%
Other taxes on income and wealth 265 0.6% 2,976 8.9%
National insurance contributions 8,393 8.1% 101,597 8.3%
VAT 9,554 20.6% 109,803 8.7%
Fuel duties 2,296 5.0% 26,798 8.6%
Stamp duties3 506 1.1% 8,919 5.7%
Tobacco duties 1,129 2.4% 9,878 11.4%
Alcohol duties 981 2.1% 10,180 9.6%
Betting and gaming and duties 115 0.2% 1,221 9.4%
Air passenger duty 213 0.5% 2,637 8.1%
Insurance premium tax 251 0.5% 3,002 8.4%
Landfill tax4 97 0.2% 1,075 9.0%
Climate change levy 64 0.1% 678 9.5%
Aggregates levy 52 0.1% 283 18.4%
Inheritance tax 159 0.4% 2,915 5.6%
Vehicle excise duty 475 1.0% 5,937 8.0%
Non-domestic rates5 1,933 4.2% 23,968 8.1%
Council tax 1,987 4.3% 25,964 7.7%
Other taxes, royalties and 
adjustments
1,028 2.2% 12,831 8.0%
Notes
1   See also Adam et al., 2013, pp. 5-17.
2   Will be replaced by the Scottish Rate of Income Tax from April 2016.
3   Will be replaced by Scottish Land and Buildings Transaction Tax from April 2014.
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4   Will be replaced by Scottish Landfill Tax from April 2014.
5   Excludes non-domestic rates which Local Authorities pay themselves.
Source: Adapted from Table 3.1 ‘Current revenue: Scotland 2011–2012’ in Scottish Government (2013b), 
Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland 2011–2012, Edinburgh: Scottish Government, p. 26. Available at 
URL: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0041/00415875.pdf. [Accessed 28 February 2014]
It is noted that North Sea tax revenue (petroleum revenue tax; corporation tax and license fees) is not included in 
the above table. Scottish Government (2013b) states that this was £942 million in 2011–2012 (p. 26); however it 
notes that this is a contested issue (ibid., Chapter 4). 
83 The Tax implicaTions of scoTTish independence or furTher devoluTion
aBouT The auThors
Jane Frecknall-Hughes is currently Professor of Revenue Law at the Open 
University Business School. After graduating from the University of Oxford, she 
became a chartered accountant and chartered tax consultant with KPMG. In 1992 
she joined the University of Leeds, gaining postgraduate teaching qualifications and 
a PhD (in Revenue Law and Tax Practice) and was awarded a master’s degree 
(with distinction) in Commercial Law from the University of Northumbria in 2007.  
She is a fellow of the Higher Education Academy. She joined the Open University in 
2008 as Professor of Accounting and later held the post of Professor of Law and 
Head of the Open University Law School. Her research focuses on taxation from 
an interdisciplinary perspective, which is reflected in her publication record in this 
area.  In addition to undertaking research within the area of tax law, she has been 
instrumental in leading tax research forward into the areas of strategic management 
(with particular reference to multinational enterprises and tax planning), 
international business, finance, history (including legal history), ethics, e-commerce 
and corporate governance. This has involved successful co-operation with scholars 
in those fields and is on-going. She has taught a wide range of subjects in the 
accounting and business law area, including taxation, and her textbook, entitled 
The Theory, Principles and Management of Taxation: An Introduction, is due to be 
published by Routledge in October 2014.
Simon James is an Associate Professor in Economics in the Department of 
Organisation Studies at the University of Exeter Business School, a Fellow of 
the Chartered Institute of Taxation, a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy, a 
Fellow of the College of Teachers and an Honorable Member of the Society for the 
Advancement of Behavioral Economics. He has also held visiting positions at six 
universities overseas, including the Australian National University, and the most 
recent was a Visiting Erskine Fellowship at the University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand in 2013.  He holds an MBA as well as Masters degrees in Economics, 
Law, Education and Educational Management, and the subject of his PhD was 
‘Taxation and Economic Decisions’. He has published over 60 research papers 
and his 15 books include The Economics of Taxation: Principles, Policy and Practice 
(with Chris Nobes), 13th edition 2013 and A Dictionary of Taxation, 2nd edition 
2012.  He has also edited a four volume collection of tax papers entitled Taxation: 
Critical Perspectives on the World Economy, published by Routledge in 2002 and is 
co-editor of Taxation: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Research, Oxford University 
Press, 2005.  His homepage may be found at: http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/
about/whoswho/index.php?web_id=Simon_James
84 The Tax implicaTions of scoTTish independence or furTher devoluTion
Rosemarie McIlwhan is currently a Lecturer in Law at the Open University Law 
School. After graduating from the University of Glasgow, she worked at the 
Scottish Human Rights Centre, becoming Director of the centre in 2000 until 2006. 
She was Director of McIlwhan Consulting from 2007-2012 where she worked 
extensively with public authorities, including Scottish, Welsh and UK Governments; 
and voluntary organisations on constitutional, human rights and leadership/
management issues. Rosemarie joined the Open University on a part-time basis 
in 2007 to teach constitutional law, and became full-time in 2012. She is also an 
Associate at the University of Edinburgh Centre for Education for Racial Equality in 
Scotland. Her research focuses on constitutional and human rights issues.
85 The Tax implicaTions of scoTTish independence or furTher devoluTion
aBouT saTer
The research project, which culminated in this publication, was funded by a grant from 
The Scottish Accountancy Trust for Education & Research (SATER) – a registered 
Scottish Charity (SC034836). The SATER Trustees are pleased to have been able to 
support this project and hope that the results are of interest and relevance to a broad 
range of users.
SATER’s objective is to promote research into, and education of, accountancy, finance 
and management together with all subjects in any way related. In fulfilling its charitable 
objectives, it also seeks to provide public benefit by making grants for research projects 
which result in reliable evidence for use in the development of policy – by professional 
bodies, standard setters, regulators or governments.
SATER is happy to receive grant applications for research projects from within and 
outwith the University sector, so long as these utilise sufficiently robust research 
methodology and the results from the project are likely to provide public benefit. 
SATER considers a broad range of grant applications from anywhere in the world. 
These do not have to be solely for research projects but can be for other research or 
education initiatives within SATER’s specific subject areas, and must be expected to 
provide public benefit.
The Trustees would like to thank the ICAS Research Committee and Research Centre 
staff for their support, through liaison with the academic team and the provision 
of advice and assistance at various stages of the project. Their role in reviewing 
publication drafts and providing constructive comments to the authors has been 
invaluable in producing publications which are easily accessible and of interest to ICAS 
members, the interested public and policy makers.
Further details about SATER and the ICAS research programme can be found from the 
SATER and ICAS websites: scottishaccountancytrust.org.uk/research.html and icas.org.
uk/research.
David Spence
Chairman of SATER
May 2014
CA House 21 Haymarket Yards Edinburgh EH12 5BH
research@icas.org.uk  +44 (0)131 347 0237  icas.org.uk/research
The vote on Scottish Independence will take place on 18 September 2014. Irrespective of the 
result, it is likely that Scotland will eventually have more say over its taxes than it currently does, 
either through independence or some form of further devolution.  
This report, by a team of independent academics, considers the tax implications relating to 
Scottish independence or further devolution.  In line with the apolitical stance taken by ICAS, 
this report takes no view on the desirability of the various options, but rather sets out to help 
establish the factors that should be taken into account if change is to be achieved successfully.  
Whilst focusing on Scotland, some of the issues raised in this report would also be relevant to 
other jurisdictions that are considering some form of devolution of taxes or the establishment of 
a new tax system.
The project sought to address, by way of a review of existing literature and interviews, 
issues such as: the suitability of the current tax system to Scotland; practical issues arising 
in developing and administering a new tax system; the determining factors for designing a 
new system; the trade-offs and compromises involved; the time required for implementation; 
implementation issues; risks; educational needs to support a new system; compliance issues; 
and insights from other countries.
The report suggests that the tax implications of independence or devolution may be more 
complex than widely thought, and highlights issues that will need to be considered under both 
options.  Whilst many of the issues arising under further devolution or independence will be the 
same, albeit to a different scale, other issues identified are specific to independence, such as the 
design of a new tax system and the status of double taxation agreements.   
ISBN 978-1-909883-06-2
EAN 9781909883062
Price: £10.00
